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CRIMINAL HARASSMENT LAWS,  
AND “CYBERSTALKING” 
Eugene Volokh 
ABSTRACT—Until recently, criminal “harassment” usually referred to 
telephone harassment—unwanted communications to a particular person. 
Likewise, stalking laws were originally created to deal with people who 
were physically following a person or trying to talk to that person. The 
same has historically been true with regard to restraining orders. 
But in recent years, these laws have been increasingly reworded or 
interpreted in ways that also cover speech about a person, even when that 
speech is communicated to potentially willing listeners. The law is in effect 
returning to an era when criminal libel laws could impose liability not just 
for falsehoods, but also for true statements or opinions that were 
supposedly not said with “good motives.” 
This Article will argue that this approach is unconstitutional when 
applied to speech said about the target rather than just to the target, at least 
when the speech is outside the traditional First Amendment exceptions 
(chiefly threats and “fighting words,” plus perhaps libel). Courts should 
therefore reject the application of these laws to such one-to-many speech, 
and legislatures should resist the broadening of such laws. 
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I’m delighted to have been invited to participate in this Festschrift 
honoring Marty Redish, whose theoretical and doctrinal First Amendment 
work I have long admired. Having little to add to Marty’s important 
contributions on the particular subjects that he has confronted, and little to 
say in disagreement with them, I thought I’d follow another Festschrift 
tradition by writing an article in Marty’s honor and in Marty’s field, 
inspired by the high standards that he has set. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Let me begin with four stories, as it happens all from Summer 2011. 
1. Philip Speulda was a primary candidate for the Hawthorne, New 
Jersey city council. One of Speulda’s campaign flyers, pictured below in 
Figure 1, included a picture of his opponent, Robert Van Deusen, in a hot 
tub with two other men. (Van Deusen apparently had the picture taken as a 
joke and had posted it online himself.) Speulda used the photo to suggest 
that Van Deusen shouldn’t be elected because he was gay, or at least 
because he had acted inappropriately by posting the photo.1 
It was a silly flyer from someone who wasn’t a serious candidate, and 
it likely didn’t impress the voters. But it did impress the police, who in 
June 2011 issued Speulda a criminal summons for “harassment.” Under 
New Jersey law, it is a crime to, “with purpose to harass another . . . 
[m]ake[] . . . a communication . . . anonymously or at extremely 
inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner 
 
1 See Complaint–Summons, State v. Speulda, No. 1604-S-2011-000159 (Hawthorne Bor. Mun. Ct., 
June 9, 2011), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/speuldacomplaint.
pdf; Kristie Cattafi, Hawthorne PD Files Harassment Charges Against Primary Candidate, GAZETTE 
(Hawthorne, N.J.) (June 28, 2011, 12:28 PM), http://www.northjersey.com/news/124654139_
Harassment_charges_filed_against_candidate.html.  
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likely to cause annoyance or alarm.”2 The police theory was apparently that 
the flyer was made with the “purpose to harass” Van Deusen and was 
“likely to cause annoyance or alarm” to Van Deusen. Some months later, 
the charges were dismissed, though with no precedent being set foreclosing 
similar future uses of the statute.3 































                        
 
2 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-4 (West 2005). 
3 Kristie Cattafi, Harassment Charges Dismissed Against Hawthorne Primary Candidate, GAZETTE 
(Hawthorne, N.J.) (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.northjersey.com/news/131197624_Harassment_charges_
dismissed_.html. 
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2. A couple of weeks later, an anonymous cartoonist who went by 
MrFuddlesticks created a set of Internet video cartoons parodying the 
Renton, Washington police department. Some of the videos seemed to 
relate to real incidents, including incidents with a sexual component, and 
some of the police officers who were involved in those incidents could be 
identified by those in the know.4 
The city prosecutor concluded that the videos might constitute 
“cyberstalking,” which is defined under Washington law as “mak[ing] an 
electronic communication to [another] person or a third party” “with intent 
to harass, intimidate, torment, or embarrass [that] other person” “[u]sing 
any lewd, lascivious, indecent, or obscene words, images, or language.”5 
The theory was that some of the sexual references used “lewd” or 
“indecent” words, and that the video was created “with intent to harass, 
intimidate, torment, or embarrass” its subjects.6 The prosecutor got a search 
warrant aimed at figuring out MrFuddlesticks’ identity, though after a 
public outcry the warrant was stayed and later withdrawn, and the city 
decided not to press charges.7 
3. Around the same time, Johanna Hamrick—who runs the Berea Post 
blog and had been candidate for mayor and city council president of Berea, 
Ohio—posted various items critical of Norma Kleem. Kleem was a 
member of the Berea Commission on Aging, the organizer of the Berea 
July Fourth parade, and the sister of Berea mayor Cyril Kleem. One of 
Hamrick’s blog posts read: 
 DON’T FORGET YOUR TOMATOES! 
 As the Fourth of July Parade is approaching we are getting so excited here 
at The Berea Post. It is sure to be a special year as we have heard of only one 
parade participant having a discriminatory letter. 
 All persons receive a letter to be a part of the parade. As you guessed it, 
you have to return your form to Norma Kleem. In prior years she has limited 
who is allowed in the gate, what vehicles, and many other obstacles have been 
 
4 Cartoonist Targeted with Criminal Probe for Mocking Police, KIROTV.COM (Aug. 3, 2011, 4:46 
PM), http://www.kirotv.com/news/news/cartoonist-targeted-with-criminal-probe-for-mockin/nDjfB; see 
also Affidavit for Search Warrant, In re King County Search Warrants 11-1172, No. 11-2-12056-2 
KNT (Wash. Super. Ct. July 28, 2011), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/crimharass/
61571607-Renton-Parody-Doc1-8.pdf; Declaration of City of Renton Police Chief Kevin Milosevich, 
In re King County, No. 11-2-12056-2 KNT (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2011), available at http://www.
volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Renton-Declarations.pdf.  
5 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (West 2010). 
6 City of Renton’s Response to Movant’s Motions at 4 n.3, 5, In re King County, No. 11-2-12056-2 
KNT (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2011) (emphasis omitted), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/Renton-Memorandum.pdf (arguing that the videos “involve the use of obscene 
language by using the ‘F’ word” and “suggest the commission of a lewd or lascivious act . . . when 
discussing [alleged] sexual relations in a car or while bent over a motorcycle”). 
7 Jeff Hodson, Renton Drops Court Quest to Find ‘Mrfuddlesticks,’ SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 11, 
2011, at B1. 
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put up. This year the letter was the same as prior years, all except one. One 
persons letter stated that only Berea City Fire Trucks were allowed in. Why? 
Well if the City Club gets their donated fire truck in, someone could look 
better on the fire truck. Yes, one letter stated this information. How low can 
you go? Well the little dictator wants control. Little dictator wants to make 
sure any opponent is denied like in past years. 
 Please Sunday July 3rd, DO NOT FORGET YOUR TOMATOES!!! I truly 
would love to chuck one right at someone in THAT camp. It would be quite 
enjoyable. Happy Independence Day Berea.8 
Now, if Hamrick had thrown a tomato at Kleem, she would have been 
guilty of a crime. Perhaps if Hamrick’s post were seen as serious—maybe 
based on past interactions between Hamrick and Kleem—she might be 
guilty of punishable solicitation of crime.9 But the Ohio legal system’s 
response to Hamrick’s post was something else: Norma Kleem sought a 
protection order against Hamrick based on this post and other conduct 
(including, allegedly, following Kleem in her car and trying to hit Kleem 
with her car), and Judge Nancy Russo entered the following order: 
[Hamrick] is prohibited from posting any information/comments/threats/or 
any other data on any internet site, regarding the petitioner and any member of 
her immediate or extended family; . . . Respon[dent] is known to post as Lilly 
on the cleveland.com blog and Berea Post; she is prohibited from 
blogging/posting on any site [about] petitioner including but not limited to 
these blogs.10 
So Hamrick was barred from saying anything on her own blog or in the 
comments to the Cleveland.com blog either about local commissioner and 
parade organizer Norma Kleem or about her brother Mayor Cyril Kleem. 
The order was reversed a week later.11 
4. One week later, federal prosecutors started a criminal harassment 
prosecution in Maryland. Alyce Zeoli is a leading American Tibetan 
Buddhist religious figure,12 the subject of a somewhat critical book-length 
biography written by a Washington Post writer,13 and a Twitter user with 
 
8 Johanna Hamrick, Don’t Forget Your Tomatoes!, BEREA POST, http://berea-post.celebration-
of.com/About.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2012). 
9 Compare United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (solicitation of child pornography is 
constitutionally unprotected), with Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107–09 (1973) (per curiam) 
(statement by a demonstrator, as an illegal demonstration was being cleared up, that “We’ll take the 
fucking street later” was constitutionally protected even if seen as “advocacy of illegal action at some 
indefinite future time”). 
10 Order of Protection at 3, Kleem v. Hamrick, No. CV 11 761954 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 15, 
2011), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/KleemvHamrickOrder.pdf. 
11 Journal Entry, Kleem, No. CV 11 761954, available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/07/KleemvHamrickOrder.pdf, at 5. 
12 Martha Sherrill, The Buddha from Poolesville, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2000, at W12. As of 2000, 
Zeoli was the leader of the largest Tibetan Buddhist monastery in the United States. 
13 MARTHA SHERRILL, THE BUDDHA FROM BROOKLYN (2000). 
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23,000 followers.14 William Lawrence Cassidy had gotten involved with 
Zeoli’s Buddhist group (Kunzang Palyul Choling) to the point of becoming 
Chief Operating Officer of the group; but he was then expelled because he 
had apparently lied to them about having had cancer and because “they 
came to doubt his reincarnation credentials.”15 After he left, Cassidy began 
to post insulting Twitter messages about Zeoli, eventually producing about 
8000 tweets over the span of several months.16 
A few could be seen as potentially threatening, e.g., “ya like haiku? 
Here’s one for ya: ‘Long, Limb, Sharp Saw, Hard Drop’ ROFLMAO.”17 
But others were criticisms of Zeoli: for instance, “[Zeoli] is a demonic 
force who tries to destroy Buddhism” and “[Zeoli] is no dakini: shes a 
grossly overweight 61 yr old burnt out freak with bad bowels & a lousy 
outlook: her ‘crown’ is a joke.”18 And federal prosecutors prosecuted 
Cassidy not under the threat provision of the statute,19 but rather on the 
theory that Cassidy’s messages constituted the federal crime of “engag[ing] 
in a course of conduct [using the mail or interactive computer services] that 
caused substantial emotional distress to a person” “with the intent to harass 
and cause substantial emotional distress to [that] person.”20 The district 
judge eventually threw out the prosecution on First Amendment grounds.21 
In May 2012, a Maryland court likewise enjoined a blogger from 
blogging about a political activist who was also a convicted criminal.22 
Some weeks later, a Massachusetts court ordered a blogger (and former 
 
14 Somini Sengupta, Case of 8,000 Menacing Posts Tests Limits of Twitter Speech, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 27, 2011, at A1. 
15 Id. 
16 United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 579 (D. Md. 2011). 
17 Careful readers may notice that this is not actually a haiku. 
18 Criminal Complaint at 5–6, Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (No. 11-501 CBD). 
19 Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 583 n.11. 
20 Id. at 576; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2006). 
 Cassidy apparently deliberately copied Zeoli on his tweets by including the text @ZeoliUserName, 
which would lead those tweets to show up in Zeoli’s @Mentions tab in Twitter. One might argue that 
this decision to include the @ sign followed by Zeoli’s username makes the tweets one-to-one speech 
sent to Zeoli as well as one-to-many speech about Zeoli. But this wasn’t the government’s theory. The 
indictment doesn’t refer to sending messages to Zeoli; it says Cassidy is guilty for “us[ing] an 
interactive computer service . . . to engage in a course of conduct that caused substantial emotional 
distress to that person, to wit: the posting of messages on www.twitter.com and other Internet websites 
concerning [Alyce Zeoli].” Indictment, Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (No. 11 CR 0091). The criminal 
complaint filed by the FBI agent doesn’t note any use of the @ feature by Cassidy; indeed, it lists 
Cassidy’s anti-Zeoli blog posts alongside his Twitter messages—blog posts, of course, don’t have an 
analog to the @ feature. Criminal Complaint, Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (No. 11 CR 0091). And the 
statute under which Cassidy is being prosecuted doesn’t impose any such limitation. 
21 Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 581–88. 
22 Final Peace Order, Kimberlin v. Walker, No. 0601SP019792012 (Md. Dist. Ct. May 19, 2012), 
available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/crimharass/AaronWorthing-order.jpg; Hearing at 59–60, 
Kimberlin, No. 0601SP019792012 (Md. Dist. Ct. May 29, 2012). I assisted the defendant’s lawyer, on a 
pro bono basis, in getting the order vacated. 
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professional journalist) to remove his blog posts about a woman who had 
been accused of criminal negligence and leaving the scene of an accident 
after hitting a pedestrian with her car, and who happened to be the daughter 
of a local judge.23 Both orders were vacated by higher courts.24 
And these are just the most explicitly political examples. Courts have 
enjoined people from saying anything at all online about ex-lovers25 or ex-
spouses’ lawyers.26 Courts have enjoined people from criticizing those with 
whom the people have had business dealings.27 One court has issued a 
restraining order based on a defendant’s having repeatedly publicized the 
fact that the plaintiff had been suspended from practicing law for 
defrauding a client.28 The court concluded that the defendant was motivated 
not by any “legitimate purpose” of informing people of plaintiff’s 
professional misconduct, but only by hostility arising out of a past real 
 
23 Harassment Prevention Order, Nilan v. Valenti, No. 12 27RO 235 (Mass. Dist. Ct. June 27, 
2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/nilanorder.png; Andrew 
Amelinckx, Judge Gives Nilan Harassment Protection from Valenti, Orders Him to Redact Blog, 
BERKSHIRE EAGLE, June 27, 2012, available at LexisNexis. 
24 Order of Denial of Petition for Peace Order, Kimberlin v. Walker, No. 8526D (Md. Cir. Ct. July 
5, 2012), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/crimharass/99246349-Peace-Order-Vacated-7-5-
12.pdf; Modification, Extension or Termination of Harassment Prevention Order, Nilan, No. 12 27RO 
235 (Mass. Dist. Ct. July 9, 2012). 
25 Morelli v. Morelli, No. A06-04-60750-C, at 9 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. June 6, 2011), available at http://
www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/crimharass/MorelliTranscript.pdf (“Father [sic] shall take down that website 
and shall never on any public media make any reference to mother at all, nor any reference to the 
relationship between mother and children, nor shall he make any reference to his children other than 
‘happy birthday’ or other significant school events.”); Injunction at 2, Schmidt v. Ferguson, No. 
10CV1611 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/
2010/09/ferguson-schmidt-order.pdf (“Respondent may NOT use internet in any manner to 
communicate about Petitioner ever again.”); see also Flash v. Holtsclaw, 789 N.E.2d 955, 957–58 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2003) (discussing court order banning an ex-boyfriend from sending letters about his ex-
girlfriend to local bars, asking that they not serve alcohol to her). 
26 Injunction at 3, Martin v. Ferguson, No. 10CV2326 (Wis. Cir. Ct. June 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.volokh.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/ferguson-martin-order.pdf (“Respondent may 
not use the internet in any manner to communicate about petitioner [respondent’s ex-husband’s lawyer] 
or her law firm while the injunction is in place.”); id. (“Respondent shall immediately remove website 
www.lisamartin-attorney.com from the internet and shall make no future websites or postings to other 
websites, or on Yahoo, regarding petitioner or her law firm while the injunction is in place.”). 
27 See, e.g., R.D. v. P.M., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 791, 800 n.11 (Ct. App. 2011) (upholding an injunction 
that barred defendant from, among other things, distributing leaflets critical of plaintiff near plaintiff’s 
workplace; though defendant argued that she had distributed these leaflets “to inform consumers about 
her negative experience with [defendant] as a clinical social worker,” “[t]he trial court concluded . . . 
that [plaintiff’s] intention was less to address an issue of public importance than to harass [defendant]”); 
Lamont v. Gilday, No. 07-2-37030-7SEA, 2008 WL 4448652, at *3–4 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2008) 
(concluding that defendant’s statements accusing plaintiff, a small businesswoman for whom he had 
worked as a handyman, were false and defamatory, and enjoining plaintiff from making any statements 
about plaintiff “and/or [this] lawsuit or anyone who testified in the trial, either directly by name, or 
indirectly by reference, via . . . any . . . form of communication”). 
28 Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 752 N.W.2d 359 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). For more on the underlying 
fraud, see In re Gilbert, 595 N.W.2d 715 (Wis. 1999) (per curiam). 
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estate transaction in which defendant had lost out in the bidding to the 
plaintiff; therefore, according to the court, the speech constituted criminal 
harassment.29 
 
 * * * 
 
A few decades ago, criminal “harassment” usually referred to 
telephone harassment—unwanted communications to a particular person. 
Likewise, stalking laws were originally created to deal with people who 
were physically following a person or trying to talk to that person.30 The 
same has historically been true with regard to restraining orders. But, as the 
examples given above show, these laws have been increasingly reworded 
or interpreted in ways that also cover speech about a person, even when 
that speech is communicated to potentially willing listeners. 
The law seems to be returning—not deliberately, but in effect—to an 
era when criminal libel laws could impose liability not just for falsehoods, 
but also for true statements or opinions that were supposedly not said with 
“good motives.”31 To be sure, the laws require that the speech be 
distressing, annoying, abusive, or harassing, rather than injurious to 
reputation, and they generally require an intent to distress, annoy, abuse, or 
harass rather than just generally “bad motives.” But in practice, the laws 
are starting to be applied to speech about a person (rather than just speech 
to a person) when the speech is harshly critical and thus potentially 
damaging to reputation, as in the examples given above.32 Without any 
reference to criminal libel laws, and indeed in jurisdictions where even 
criminal libel laws limited to false factual assertions have been repealed, 
some judges and legislatures seem to be responding to the same feeling that 
drove the old criminal libel laws: people should be legally barred from 
saying derogatory things (even opinions or true statements) about other 
people unless they have a good reason to do so. 
This Article will argue, however, that such an approach is 
unconstitutional when applied to speech said about the target rather than 
just to the target, at least when the speech is outside the traditional First 
Amendment exceptions (chiefly threats and “fighting words,” plus perhaps 
libel and other knowing falsehoods). Courts should therefore reject the 
 
29 Welytok, 752 N.W.2d at 370. Though the speaker wasn’t prosecuted for the harassment, he was 
ordered not to engage in such speech in the future; the injunction that the court upheld banned 
“harassment,” id. at 371, and the court concluded that the defendant’s speech had indeed constituted 
harassment. 
30 See Robert A. Guy, Jr., Note, The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 991, 992–93 (1993). 
31 See, e.g., State v. Hoskins, 80 N.W. 1063, 1063 (Iowa 1899). 
32 See supra notes 27–28 (citing R.D., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 791, and Welytok, 752 N.W.2d 359); infra 
note 268 (discussing State v. Ellison, 900 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008)).  
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application of such laws to one-to-many speech, and legislatures should 
resist the broadening of such laws. The Supreme Court has expressly 
rejected the notion that derogatory statements on matters of public concern 
about people can be punished based on bad motives. And the logic of other 
Supreme Court opinions suggests that the same rejection of a bad motive 
First Amendment exception should apply even to statements on matters of 
supposedly private concern.33 (I speak here of constitutional protection 
against injunctions, criminal punishment, and civil liability. In this Article, 
I don’t discuss the government’s power as K–12 educator to restrict speech 
by students that disrupts the educational environment for other students—
whether the speech is on campus or off campus34—or for that matter the 
government’s power as employer.35) 
Some courts36 and legislatures have indeed narrowed criminal 
harassment laws in response to First Amendment objections. The 
Tennessee legislature, for instance, enacted a broad law in 2011 but then 
dramatically narrowed it in 2012 in response to public criticism.37 Both 
houses of the Arizona legislature likewise passed such a broad law in 2012 
but then dramatically narrowed it, following a flurry of public criticism, 
 
33 See infra Part II.E.1. 
34 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (concluding 
that the government as K–12 educator may discipline students for their speech if it is sufficiently 
disruptive of the school’s operation, in a case involving on-campus speech); Layshock ex rel. Layshock 
v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219–22 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., concurring) (noting that the 
question whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech is not settled).  
35 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (noting that the government as 
employer may dismiss or discipline employees for their speech if it is sufficiently disruptive of the 
employer’s operation).  
36 See, e.g., United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011). 
37 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 362 amended TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-308 (2010) to ban (among 
other things) purposefully, knowingly, or negligently “caus[ing] emotional distress” to a person by 
“transmit[ting] or display[ing] an image [without legitimate purpose] in a manner in which there is a 
reasonable expectation that the image will be viewed by the victim.” This led to a good deal of 
criticism, apparently beginning with a blog post of mine on the Volokh Conspiracy blog and continuing 
in turn to other blogs, a political blog on a Tennessee newspaper’s website, and mainstream media 
outlets. See Eugene Volokh, Crime to Post Images that Cause “Emotional Distress” “Without 
Legitimate Purpose,” VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 6, 2011, 2:37 PM), http://www.volokh.com/
?p=47003; see also Mike Masnick, Post a Picture that ‘Causes Emotional Distress’ and  
You Could Face Jailtime in Tennessee, TECHDIRT (June 7, 2011, 11:33 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20110606/22513614573/post-picture-that-causes-emotional-distress-you-could-face-jailtime-
tennessee.shtml; Michael Silence, TN’s ‘Unconstitutional’ Law on What You Say on the Internet, 
KNOXNEWS.COM: NO SILENCE HERE (June 9, 2011, 10:07 AM), http://blogs.knoxnews.com/silence/
archives/2011/06/tns_unconstitut.shtml; e.g., Erica Horton & Richard Locker, Law Tough on Cyber 
Bullies, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, June 11, 2011, at B1. Several months later, the Tennessee 
Legislature amended the law that essentially limited the statute to constitutionally unprotected threats. 
2012 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 992 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-308 (Supp. 2012)). 
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before sending it to the Governor.38 This attention to First Amendment 
concerns is good, and there ought to be more of it. 
I. THE ORIGIN OF HARASSMENT, STALKING, AND RESTRAINING ORDER 
LAWS: UNWANTED SPEECH TO A PARTICULAR PERSON 
A. Restrictions on Unwanted One-to-One Speech 
For many decades, American law has restricted certain kinds of 
unwanted speech said to a particular person: 
• State and federal telephone harassment laws have long banned 
calls made to people with the intent to “abuse,” “annoy,” 
“harass,” or “offend” (sometimes with the limitation that the calls 
must be repeated or anonymous).39 
• More recently, stalking laws have banned (among other things) 
repeated annoying letters, phone calls, or personal contacts with a 
person.40 
• Federal law has let any householder ban further mailings to his 
home of “advertisements that offer for sale ‘matter which the 
addressee in his sole discretion believes to be erotically arousing 
 
38 H.B. 2549, sec. 1, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2012) (Senate engrossed version), would have 
provided that it was a crime (among other things) “for any person, with intent to . . . harass, annoy or 
offend, to use any electronic . . . device and use any obscene, lewd or profane language.” This led to a 
good deal of criticism, apparently beginning with a letter from the Media Coalition to the Arizona 
Governor, which was reported by the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund site, which was then in turn 
picked up by a post of mine on the Volokh Conspiracy blog, which was then linked to by various other 
blogs, and then eventually picked up by mainstream media outlets. See Letter from David Horowitz, 
Exec. Dir., Media Coal., Inc., to Gov. Janice Brewer, Request for Veto of House Bill 2549 (Mar. 29, 
2012), available at http://mediacoalition.org/mediaimages/ AZ%20HB%202549%20Letter%20to%
20Governor%20Brewer%20requesting%20veto%203%2029%202012.pdf; Charles Brownstein, 
Arizona Legislature Passes Sweeping Electronic Speech Censorship Bill, COMIC BOOK LEGAL DEF. 
FUND (Mar. 30, 2012), http://cbldf.org/homepage/arizona-legislature-passes-sweeping-electronic-
speech-censorship-bill; Eugene Volokh, A Crime to Use “Any Electronic or Digital Device” “And Use 
Any Obscene, Lewd or Profane Language” “With Intent to . . . Offend”?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 
31, 2012, 9:11 PM), http://www.volokh.com/?p=58105; e.g., Alyssa Newcomb, ‘Annoying, Offending’ 
Language Online Would Be Crime Under Arizona Bill, ABC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2012), http://abcnews.go.
com/US/arizona-passes-internet-bullying-bill/story?id=16063158. (A search through the LEXIS 
NEWS;CURNWS database for arizona and harass! and electronic and date(< 6/1/2012) and date(> 
3/1/2012) can give some sense of the progress of the story.) 
 After a good deal of criticism, the bill was limited to speech that was either “direct[ed]” to the 
person whom the speaker intended to “harass,” speech that threatened physical harm, or speech that 
consisted of “anonymous, unwanted or unsolicited electronic communications” and disturbed “the 
peace, quiet or right of privacy” of the recipient. It was this narrower version that was enacted. H.B. 
2549, sec. 1, 50th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2012) (Conference engrossed version).  
39 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C), (E) (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:285(A)(2) (2004); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196(a)(3) (2011). 
40 See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 22-3132 to -3133 (LexisNexis 2010). 
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or sexually provocative.’”41 I will call this the Rowan law after the 
case, Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, that upheld 
the statute. Some states have likewise barred unwanted mailings 
or unwanted telephone calls after the recipient has said “stop,” 
generally without limitation to “erotically arousing” material.42 
• Restraining order laws have allowed people to get court orders 
barring further letters, phone calls, or personal contact from a 
particular person.43 
Some of these laws have been struck down in some states,44 but on balance 
they have generally been upheld by lower courts;45 and the Supreme Court 
has upheld the federal ban on repeated unwanted mailings.46 
 
41 Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 730 (1970) (citing 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a) (1964 
ed., Supp. IV)). 
42 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2913.01(X), 2917.21(A)(5) (West 2006) (banning any 
“telecommunication,” including telephone calls and e-mails, after the recipient “has told the caller not 
to make a telecommunication to those premises or to any persons at those premises”); Dzwonczyk v. 
Syracuse City Police Dep’t, 710 F. Supp. 2d 248, 266 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (concluding that repeatedly 
transmitting “unwanted written and verbal communications” on religious themes to a particular person, 
when the sender had “been twice contacted by police regarding the matter,” could constitute criminal 
harassment); State v. Rettig, Nos. 7-91-14, 7-91-15, 1992 WL 19326, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 3, 
1992) (upholding a similar state law provision and citing Rowan); Ramsey v. Edgepark, Inc., 583 
N.E.2d 443, 452 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (upholding an injunction against repeated unwanted mailings 
and citing Rowan). 
43 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 527.6, 527.8 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013). 
44 See, e.g., People v. Gomez, 843 P.2d 1321, 1323–24 (Colo. 1993) (striking down as 
unconstitutionally vague a ban on any conduct that intentionally “harasses, threatens or abuses another 
person”); Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80, 81 & n.1 (Colo. 1975) (striking down a telephone harassment 
statute that banned “communicat[ing] with a person . . . by telephone, telegraph, mail, or any other form 
of communication, in a manner likely to harass or cause alarm”); People v. Klick, 362 N.E.2d 329, 330, 
332 (Ill. 1977) (striking down a telephone harassment statute that banned “mak[ing] a telephone call” 
“[w]ith intent to annoy”); State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415, 417–18 (Minn. 1998) (striking down a 
ban on “intentional conduct” that causes “a reasonable person . . . to feel oppressed, persecuted, or 
intimidated”); State v. Vaughn, 366 S.W.3d 513, 519–20 (Mo. 2012) (striking down a ban on “repeated 
unwanted communication to another person”); State v. Pierce, 887 A.2d 132, 133, 135 (N.H. 2005) 
(striking down, without citing Rowan, a ban on “communicat[ing] with [a] person” “with the purpose to 
annoy or alarm [such person], having been previously notified that the recipient does not desire further 
communication”); State v. Brobst, 857 A.2d 1253, 1254, 1257 (N.H. 2004) (striking down a ban on 
telephone calls made “with a purpose to annoy or alarm”); State v. Blair, 601 P.2d 766, 767 (Or. 1979) 
(striking down a ban on “communicat[ing] with a person” “in a manner [intended to and] likely to cause 
annoyance or alarm”); City of Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617, 618, 620 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) 
(striking down a law banning “communicat[ing] with a person . . . in a manner likely to [and intended 
to] cause annoyance or alarm” or “engag[ing] in a course of conduct that [intentionally] alarms or 
seriously annoys another person and which serves no legitimate purpose”); State v. Dronso, 279 
N.W.2d 710, 712 n.1, 714 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (striking down a ban on “mak[ing] a telephone call” 
“[w]ith intent to annoy another”); see also Gormley v. Dir., Conn. State Dep’t of Adult Prob., 449 U.S. 
1023 (1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (suggesting that a statute that bans 
telephone calls that are intended to and likely to “cause annoyance or alarm” is likely unconstitutional). 
45 See, e.g., United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1978); City of Montgomery v. 
Zgouvas, 953 So. 2d 434, 443 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006); South v. City of Mountain Brook, 688 So. 2d 
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But all these laws have one thing in common: In the great bulk of their 
applications, they restrict what one may call “unwanted one-to-one” 
speech—speech said to a particular person in a context where the recipient 
appears not to want to hear it, whether because the recipient has expressly 
demanded that the speech stop or because the speaker intends to annoy or 
offend the recipient.47 The laws are aimed at restricting speech to a person, 
not speech about a person. And that is the context in which they have 
generally been upheld against First Amendment challenge.48 
This is especially clear with regard to traditional telephone harassment 
law and unwanted postal contact law because the telephone and the letter 
are one-to-one media: each phone call or letter has one particular 
recipient.49 In principle, stalking laws and harassment orders could be 
broader and could apply to speech said to the public (or to individual 
willing listeners) that annoys the subject of the speech. Indeed, those are 
the applications that this Article criticizes. But when the stalking and 
harassment laws have been upheld, this has almost invariably been in one-
to-one speech cases and with arguments that made sense because of the 
one-to-one nature of the speech.50 
When the laws apply to one-to-one unwanted speech, they interfere 
only slightly with debate and the spread of information—both grant 
 
292 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); People v. Weeks, 591 P.2d 91, 95 (Colo. 1979), overruled on other 
grounds by People v. Seven Thirty-Five E. Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1985); State v. Roesch, 
Nos. CR94-87735, CR94-87736 & CR94-90639, 1995 WL 356776, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 6, 
1995); State v. Elder, 382 So. 2d 687, 689 (Fla. 1980); Constantino v. State, 255 S.E.2d 710, 713 (Ga. 
1979); State v. Richards, 896 P.2d 357, 362 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); People v. Blackwood, 476 N.E.2d 
742, 746 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Rzeszutek v. Beck, 649 N.E.2d 673, 680–81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Yates 
v. Commonwealth, 753 S.W.2d 874, 875–76 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Meunier, 354 So. 2d 535, 
538 (La. 1978); State v. Cropley, 544 A.2d 302, 305 (Me. 1988); People v. Taravella, 350 N.W.2d 780, 
784 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Koetting, 691 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Gilbert v. 
State, 765 P.2d 1208 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Hauge, 547 N.W.2d 173, 175–76 (S.D. 1996); 
State v. Mott, 692 A.2d 360, 365 (Vt. 1997); State v. Alexander, 888 P.2d 175 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); 
Luplow v. State, 897 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1995). 
46 Rowan, 397 U.S. at 740. 
47 See, e.g., People v. Dupont, 486 N.Y.S.2d 169, 173 (App. Div. 1985) (stating that the harassment 
statute focuses on “annoying and harassing communications transmitted directly to the complainant” 
rather than “dissemination . . . [or] publication of vexatious material about an individual”); Kramer v. 
State, 605 S.W.2d 861, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (upholding a statute banning annoying telephone or 
written communications in vulgar language because “[n]o provision is made in [the statute] for 
punishing acts not directed to a private recipient,” and relying on Rowan); Towner v. Ridgway, 182 
P.3d 347, 352–53 (Utah 2008) (upholding an antistalking injunction because it bars “communications 
from [defendant] to [plaintiffs], not communications by [defendant] about [plaintiffs] to others”). 
48 All the cited cases in notes 45 and 47, for instance, involved one-to-one speech. 
49 I oversimplify here a little: One can address a letter to two people who live at the same home or 
call one person and ask that the person invite another person to listen in on another phone. But I think 
for our purposes such speech to a couple of family members can be treated the same as one-to-one 
speech. 
50 See cases cited supra note 45. 
107:731 (2013) Free Speech and Criminal Harassment Laws 
743 
political debate and everyday conversations among friends and 
acquaintances about what is happening in their social circle.51 A one-to-one 
unwanted statement is highly unlikely to persuade or inform anyone, 
precisely because the listener does not want to hear it. Its only effect is 
likely to be to offend or annoy. And restricting such statements thus leaves 
speakers free to communicate to other, potentially willing listeners.52 
But one-to-many speech—such as picketing, signs, drive-in movie 
screens, inscriptions on clothing, and the like—is generally constitutionally 
protected even when some of its viewers are likely to be offended.53 So 
long as some of the viewers are likely to be open to the message, the 
message remains protected, precisely because restricting the message 
would cut off constitutionally valuable communication to willing listeners 
as well as constitutionally valueless communication to unwilling listeners. 
To be sure, one-to-many speech critical of a particular person will very 
likely be seen by that person and offend that person. The subject of the 
speech might run across the speech the same way that others run across it—
for instance, if one blog commenter is saying rude things about another 
blog commenter or about the blogger. Or some other reader might alert the 
subject to the speech, and the subject might feel it necessary to figure out 
what others are saying about him. But in either case, though the subject will 
likely be offended by the speech, other readers may find the speech 
valuable. Suppressing one-to-many speech would thus unacceptably restrict 
communication to potentially willing listeners. 
Of course, this presupposes a First Amendment theory in which either 
(1) the value of speech stems from its value as a means of persuading, 
informing, or entertaining listeners, or (2) the value of speech also stems 
from its value as a means for the speaker’s self-expression, but only when 
both the speaker and listener consent to such self-expression.54 One can 
 
51 This Article generally won’t discuss the question whether injunctions against speech—as 
opposed to criminal punishment of speech—are unconstitutional prior restraints. For more on this 
question, and in particular on why permanent injunctions that follow a trial at which speech is found to 
be unprotected are generally constitutional but preliminary injunctions that are entered based on a mere 
“likelihood of success” are generally unconstitutional, see Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom 
of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 150 (1998). 
52 Cf. MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION 124 (2005) (reasoning that the freedom of 
speech is “about the freedom to persuade” and “the freedom to inform”); Martin H. Redish, 
Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 
41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 116 n.134 (2007) (noting that speech may sometimes be restricted to protect 
“unwilling listeners”). 
53 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 
(1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 
(1939). 
54 See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Reply to Critics, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 417, 434–35 (2011) 
(arguing in favor of a self-expression theory of free speech but concluding that such a theory “may 
readily . . . distinguish harassing speech on the grounds that it does not involve a consensual 
communicative relation”; “[a]lthough as thinkers we have an interest in expressing our thoughts and in 
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imagine a contrary theory under which speakers have the power to 
remonstrate with individual listeners (at least using some one-to-one 
media), even when the listeners want those communications to stop. 
But this is not the view that the Court has arrived at (as I will discuss 
in Part I.C) or that lower courts have arrived at, given the general trend of 
upholding telephone harassment and stalking laws. And I think the Court’s 
conclusion is likely correct. To the extent the First Amendment protects 
speech as a tool for advancing the search for truth, marketplace of ideas, or 
self-government, unwanted one-to-one speech does little to promote these 
goals. And to the extent that the First Amendment protects speakers’ self-
expression, it should also protect listeners’ freedom not to be intruded on 
by that self-expression (at least when preventing such intrusion leaves 
speakers free to communicate with willing listeners). As the Court 
unanimously concluded in Rowan, “no one has a right to press even ‘good’ 
ideas on an unwilling recipient.”55 
B. Protection Even for Some Unwanted One-to-One Speech 
To be sure, there are some important limitations on government power 
to restrict unwanted one-to-one speech. First, unwanted speech to some 
recipients—for instance, government officials, candidates for office, and 
possibly businesses that serve the public—might have constitutional value 
even when the listener doesn’t want to hear it. People may have the right to 
remonstrate with government agencies and petition for redress of 
grievances even when the target doesn’t want to hear the petitions or the 
petitions are offensively worded.56 
The exact scope of this principle is not clear. It doesn’t extend to 
threats,57 and it might not extend to telephone calls to an official’s home.58 
 
being known, we do not have a right to command the personal audience of any other thinkers we like, 
irrespective of their interests in hearing us out”). 
55 Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970). 
56 See United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1999); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., 630 F. Supp. 867 (D.D.C. 1986); State v. Fratzke, 446 N.W.2d 781, 783–85 (Iowa 1989) (letter to 
police officer is an attempt to “protest[] governmental action” even when it contains vulgarities and is 
“inten[ded] to annoy,” and is thus not covered by a statute that applies only to communications “without 
legitimate purpose”); State v. Drahota, 788 N.W.2d 796 (Neb. 2010). 
57 City of San Jose v. Webster, No. H026491, 2004 WL 2904438, at *3–5 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 
2004) (upholding “an injunction prohibiting [defendant] from contacting Herbert [a police department 
lieutenant] and ordering him to stay at least 300 yards away from Herbert, her home, and her 
workplace,” because Webster’s past conduct would lead “[a] reasonable person [to] fear for her 
safety”); State v. Roesch, Nos. CR94-87735, CR94-87736 & CR94-90639, 1995 WL 356776, at *8 
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 6, 1995) (upholding conviction for sending threatening letters to police officers); 
see also Luoma v. Hamm, No. CO-97-1240, 1997 WL 785701, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1997) 
(upholding injunction ordering citizen not to further contact the superintendent of schools, based on past 
communications to the superintendent that the court seemed to perceive as threatening, though stressing 
that the defendant remained free to publish his criticisms of the superintendent, to attend school board 
meetings, or communicate with other school board members). 
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It’s also not clear whether at some point repeated contacts could be 
restricted because they tie up phone lines or otherwise interfere with 
government officials’ duties in ways that are unrelated to the offensiveness 
of the communication.59 But some such protection for some unwanted one-
to-one speech to government officials should exist. 
Second, some attempts to identify unwanted speech might be 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.60 This is especially so when the 
speech is defined using terms such as “intent to annoy,” which are 
potentially broad enough to cover what should be permissible attempts to 
explain to people what they’ve done wrong—calls to businesses to tell 
them off about poor product quality, e-mails to acquaintances or former 
friends to tell them how they’ve hurt you, and the like.61 Nonetheless, 
suitably narrow and clear harassment statutes limited to one-to-one speech 
ought to be constitutional for reasons given in the preceding section. 
C. The Supreme Court Doctrine 
This distinction between one-to-one and one-to-many speech has not 
been explicitly set forth by the Supreme Court. But I think it well explains 
the Court’s tolerance for some speech restrictions. 
1. Mailings to Unwilling Recipients’ Homes.—Most clearly, Rowan 
v. United States Post Office Department upheld the ban on mailings sent to 
people who demanded that the mailer stop sending them mail, and in the 
process relied heavily on the fact that the restriction was on speech said 
specifically to an unwilling listener. “[N]o one has a right to press even 
‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient,” the Court held, and noted that the 
listener who said no to future mailings was entitled to protection as an 
“unreceptive addressee.”62 
Indeed, just a year after Rowan, Organization for a Better Austin v. 
Keefe made explicit the distinction between speech to an unwilling listener 
 
58 See, e.g., Hott v. State, 400 N.E.2d 206, 207–08 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding conviction 
under statute that banned “indecent” telephone calls, based on vulgarity-filled late-night calls to the 
homes of the chief of police and the prosecutor). 
59 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 392 N.Y.S.2d 968, 971 (App. Term 1977) (per curiam) (upholding 
conviction for calling police department twenty-seven times in three and a half hours to make a 
complaint, despite having been told that the matter was civil rather than criminal); City of E. Palestine 
v. Steinberg, Nos. 93-C-34, 93-C-35, 1994 WL 397267, at *1, *4 (Ohio Ct. App. July 21, 1994) 
(upholding conviction for calling 911 eight times in half an hour for nonemergency purposes after 
having been told to stop). 
60 See, e.g., Gilbreath v. State, 650 So. 2d 10, 12–13 (Fla. 1995) (excising from the telephone 
harassment statute the prohibition on calls made with “intent to offend [or] annoy,” on the grounds that 
“offend” and “annoy” are too vague). 
61 Cf., e.g., Paradise Hills Assocs. v. Procel, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514, 521, 523 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(concluding that disgruntled customers had a First Amendment right to picket home building company). 
62 Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737, 738 (1970). 
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and speech about an unwilling subject.63 In holding that Keefe couldn’t 
enjoin the defendants from distributing leaflets that criticized Keefe’s 
business practices in Keefe’s neighborhood, the Court concluded that, 
“[a]mong other important distinctions” between Organization for a Better 
Austin and Rowan, Keefe “[was] not attempting to stop the flow of 
information into his own household, but to the public.”64 If someone 
wanted to send things to Keefe, a statute or court order might well have 
protected Keefe from such speech. But the legal system may not protect 
Keefe from things said about him. 
Likewise, Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York65 struck down a ban on utilities’ mailing advocacy to people’s 
homes, and Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.66 struck down a ban on 
the mailing of contraceptive advertisements. Both laws were defended on 
the grounds that they protected householders from unwanted speech, but in 
both instances the Court rejected the argument. Though Rowan let 
individual householders block continued unwanted speech into their own 
homes, the government couldn’t protect unwilling householders by 
restricting mass speech that could reach willing listeners. 
“[W]e have never held,” the Court reasoned in Bolger, “that the 
Government itself can shut off the flow of mailings to protect those 
recipients who might potentially be offended.”67 Likewise, in Consolidated 
Edison, the Court relied on Martin v. City of Struthers, a case that held that 
cities couldn’t categorically ban all house-to-house political or religious 
leafleting but could enforce “No Soliciting” signs put up by the 
householders.68 So a restriction on speech that leaves speakers free to speak 
to willing listeners (e.g., the law in Rowan or a law enforcing “No 
Soliciting” signs) is constitutional. But a restriction on speech that 
interferes with speakers’ ability to speak to potentially willing listeners 
(e.g., the laws in Keefe, Bolger, and Consolidated Edison) is 
unconstitutional. And this is so even when—as in Keefe—the restrictions 
focus on speech that’s about an unwilling subject though it is said to 
potentially willing listeners. 
2. Physical Approaches to People and Continued Physical Presence 
Outside Their Homes.—Likewise, in Hill v. Colorado,69 the Court 
upheld a law that banned people from approaching within eight feet of 
others to give them leaflets unless the recipient specifically consented to 
 
63 402 U.S. 415 (1971). 
64 Id. at 420. 
65 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980). 
66 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983). 
67 Id. at 72. 
68 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943). 
69 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
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such an approach. (The law was limited to speech within 100 feet of a 
health care facility.) The law, the Court held, was constitutional because it 
focused on speech that was “so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot 
avoid it”70 and yet left open “ample alternative channels” for reaching 
potentially willing listeners.71 The Court reaffirmed the Rowan principle 
that “no one has a right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling 
recipient,” in a context where the speech was being targeted to particular 
individual listeners.72 But the Court also stressed that people remained free 
to speak in a one-to-many way to the public at large (for instance, by 
displaying signs), even if some unwilling listeners were included.73 
Frisby v. Schultz takes a similar approach. In Frisby, the Court upheld 
a content-neutral ban on residential picketing on the theory that residential 
picketing “is narrowly directed at the household, not the public. The type of 
picketers banned by the Brookfield ordinance generally do not seek to 
disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude upon the 
targeted resident, and to do so in an especially offensive way.”74 And when 
the speakers retain “ample alternative channels” for speaking to the rest of 
the public—such as marching through the neighborhood, going door-to-
door to express their views to the target’s neighbors, and the like—the 
restriction is permissible.75 
Here, the Court might have been mistaken in treating the picketing as 
“narrowly directed at the household” instead of the public. It might well be 
that residential picketing is aimed both at the subject (who will be highly 
unlikely to be persuaded or informed by the speech) and at the subject’s 
neighbors (who might find it persuasive or informative if it tells them 
something about their neighbor that they see as morally relevant). 
Nonetheless, the Court was still trying to draw a line between one-to-one 
speech to the target and one-to-many speech about the target. 
3. Radio Broadcasts.—There is one case in which the Court upheld 
a clear restriction on one-to-many speech justified by a worry that the 
speech is offensive—FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.76 But even here the 
narrowness of the Court’s decision helps illustrate the strength of the one-
to-one/one-to-many distinction. 
In Pacifica, five Justices upheld the ban on the broadcast of the “seven 
dirty words” on radio, relying partly on Rowan,77 which they characterized 
 
70 Id. at 716. 
71 Id. at 726. 
 72  Id. at 718. 
73 Id. at 714–15. 
74 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988). 
75 Id. at 483–84. 
76 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
77 Id. at 748; id. at 759 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by 
Blackmun, J.).  
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as generally allowing people to be protected from offensive messages in 
their homes. Justice Brennan’s dissent responded—in my view, correctly—
that the Rowan law was quite different. In Rowan, “householders who 
wished to receive the sender’s communications were not prevented from 
doing so.”78 But in Pacifica, which dealt with a one-to-many medium rather 
than a one-to-one medium, protecting those who are offended by vulgarity 
on the radio meant barring speech to willing listeners as well.79 
Nonetheless, this Pacifica exception was distinctly limited. The three-
Justice lead opinion made clear that its rationale rested on the “low-value” 
status of vulgarities, so the result would have presumably been different 
had the Court examined speech that is offensive but doesn’t “depict[] 
sexual and excretory activities.”80 And the three Justices also stressed that 
“if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a 
reason for according it constitutional protection.”81 
Public criticism and ridicule of a person, for instance, wouldn’t be 
stripped of constitutional protection just because they are broadcast by 
radio and arrive in the person’s home. Vulgarities broadcast on the radio 
could be restricted even in this one-to-many medium, but other speech 
could not be. 
4. Not Just Speech that Reaches into the Home.—These cases 
suggest that the protection for unwilling listeners is not limited to speech 
sent to the home, or even speech visible in the home. Rowan, Frisby, and 
Pacifica did rely on the listener’s rights to exclude unwanted speech from 
the home, but Hill did not. 
Conversely, Pacifica stated that much speech—including speech that 
contains ideas that many people might find offensive—is constitutionally 
protected even when it is conveyed by media that reach into the home 
(broadcast radio and television). The Court has also expressly declined to 
extend Pacifica to Internet communications, even though they tend to reach 
into the home to the same extent that radio does.82 And the Pacifica lead 
opinion distinguished radio from newspapers, even though newspapers are 
often delivered to the home.83 
5. The Common Threads: Intrusiveness Plus One-to-One  
Speech.—There are two common threads in the speech that can be 
restricted, at least in all the cases except Pacifica. First, the speech is seen 
as physically intruding into the listener’s private space. That literally 
happens when a door-to-door evangelist refuses to honor a “No Soliciting” 
 
78 Id. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 731–32 (Stevens, J.). 
81 Id. at 745. 
82 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
83 438 U.S. at 748–50. 
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sign.84 It happens when an unwanted letter makes its way into a recipient’s 
mailbox.85 It happens in some sense when a person receives an unwanted 
telephone call in his home,86 or even in his office (or, these days, on his cell 
phone even when he is in a public place). It also happens when someone 
approaches someone else too closely, as in Hill v. Colorado,87 or repeatedly 
follows someone even at a longer distance. The law plausibly treats all 
these sorts of speech as intruding onto a person physically, by using the 
person’s real or personal property or coming too close to that person. 
What’s more, the speech intrudes even on listeners who have not made 
an informed choice to read a particular publication and thus run the risk 
that the publication has something offensive in it. A newspaper is generally 
free to print sexually offensive material (short of obscenity), and it might 
be a shock to some readers, but at least those readers have voluntarily 
chosen to read this particular newspaper. But when we hear our telephone 
ringing, get an envelope in the mail, or get an e-mail message—especially 
when the sender’s identity is unfamiliar—we don’t make the same 
deliberate choice to read a particular item, since we don’t know what that 
item really is. And while we can avoid such intrusions by not having a 
telephone or an e-mail address, that is impractical in modern society. 
Second, in all the cases but Pacifica, the particular instance of speech 
is seen as being said to the recipient, and basically no one else, so that 
restricting the physical intrusion on the person leaves the speaker free to 
communicate to others. This is true even when, as in Rowan or in the 
Martin “No Soliciting” hypothetical, the speech is part of a broader 
campaign to reach the public at large. The campaign is accomplished 
through individual contacts, and the speaker is able to avoid the contacts 
with the unwilling listeners while still remaining free to talk to the willing 
ones. 
As I mentioned, Pacifica is the outlier here. The ban on broadcasts of 
vulgarities or sexually themed material does interfere with speech to 
willing listeners, and a radio listener or TV viewer receives a broadcast 
only when he tunes into a particular channel. Even in the old days of turn-
the-dial analog tuning, a listener would generally have a pretty good idea 
what radio station he was listening to (and especially what TV station he 
was watching). And to the extent that the listener might not know the 
precise source, that is no different from when a householder leafs through 
an unfamiliar free newspaper or magazine that he has received in the mail. 
 
84 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
85 Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
86 See, e.g., Von Lusch v. State, 387 A.2d 306, 310 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (upholding a 
telephone harassment law partly because it protects each person from “the harassment and annoyance of 
having his own telephone used in an abusive fashion by an unwanted intruder upon his privacy”). 
87 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
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The justly controversial Pacifica, though, has to be seen as a narrow 
case that was limited from the outset and has remained limited since. First, 
the lead opinion relies heavily on the judgment that the particular speech at 
issue in that case—vulgarities—is of low value.88 Second, and relatedly, the 
lead opinion stresses that the speech was offensive only because of the 
particular words that were chosen and not because of the offensive 
message.89 Third, the Court stressed the accessibility of radio to children,90 
“even those too young to read.”91 
Fourth, the lead opinion noted that the material was broadcast during 
the day, and left open the possibility that the same speech would be 
constitutionally protected if broadcast at night,92 something that the D.C. 
Circuit later specifically held.93 This further highlights the focus on 
protecting small children rather than protecting unwilling listeners, since 
unwilling listeners may be present at night and not just during the day. 
Fifth, the lead opinion noted that the case didn’t involve a criminal 
prosecution.94 
Finally, since Pacifica, the Court has refused to extend Pacifica, 
treating it as inapplicable to the Internet, even though the Internet, like 
radio and television broadcasting, is accessible from people’s homes.95 
Whether the Court will ultimately expressly overrule Pacifica is unclear; 
though Justices Thomas and Ginsburg suggested in recent opinions that 
they would do so, the other Justices have not spoken to that.96 But the Court 
certainly hasn’t been treating Pacifica as a precedent that has broad 
analogical force outside radio and television broadcasting. 
So the general pattern, I think, holds. There does seem to be something 
of an exception to First Amendment protection for one-to-one speech that 
is addressed to an unwilling listener and that can be restricted without 
blocking communication to willing listeners. The exception might extend 
only to situations where the speech physically intrudes into the listener’s 
property or into an area around the listener. And, setting aside Pacifica, the 
exception is indeed limited to one-to-one speech to an offended listener and 
not one-to-many speech even when it is about an offended subject. 
 
88 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746–47 (Stevens, J.). 
89 Id. at 746.  
90 Id. at 749 (majority opinion). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 750 n.28. 
93 Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
94 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750. 
95 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
96 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (II), 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2321 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (I), 556 U.S. 502, 532–34 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
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II. INSULTING SPEECH ABOUT PEOPLE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. The General Protection of Speech About People 
Restrictions on public speech about a person, then, stand on very 
different First Amendment footing from restrictions on unwanted speech to 
the person. Such restrictions on speech about a person can be constitutional 
when limited to speech that falls within the recognized First Amendment 
exceptions, such as threats, libel, and intentional incitement to likely and 
imminent criminal attack.97 But when one-to-many speech about people 
falls outside these exceptions, it should be constitutionally protected. 
As I mentioned above, I don’t want to claim that one-to-many speech 
is less harmful than one-to-one speech. Indeed, many people might be 
much more upset about insulting things said publicly about them—to 
listeners who might be influenced by such criticism—than about insulting 
things said directly to them. 
Nonetheless, for reasons discussed in Part I, one-to-many speech has 
full First Amendment value because it involves the expression of facts and 
opinions aimed at informing and persuading potentially willing listeners. It 
should therefore generally be constitutionally protected, notwithstanding 
the offense and distress it causes to its subjects. And this is certainly where 
current First Amendment doctrine points. 
B. First Amendment Exceptions: Threats, Knowingly False Statements, 
Incitement, and Solicitation 
Let me begin by elaborating briefly on the First Amendment 
exceptions I just mentioned in the preceding section. 
1. Threats.—Speech about people can be punished when it 
constitutes a “true threat” of criminal attack.98 Most harassment laws cover 
true threats,99 and some are limited to them.100 
 
97 See, e.g., O’Brien v. Borowski, 961 N.E.2d 547, 554–57 (Mass. 2012) (interpreting the state 
harassment prevention order statute as limited to the constitutionally unprotected categories of fighting 
words and threats). Harassment laws may also cover fighting words, but that exception is generally 
limited to face-to-face speech to a person. See, e.g., State v. Drahota, 788 N.W.2d 796, 802–04 (Neb. 
2010). I therefore will not discuss it in this Part, which is focused on one-to-many speech about the 
target. 
98 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per 
curiam). 
99 See, e.g., People v. Parkins, 396 N.E.2d 22, 24 (Ill. 1979) (reading the statute as limited to threats 
and therefore constitutional); People v. Munn, 688 N.Y.S.2d 384, 386 (Crim. Ct. 1999) (holding that the 
harassment statute permissibly covers threats). Not all forms of speech that might be labeled “threats,” 
however, may be punished; for instance, State v. Williams, 26 P.3d 890, 894, 896 (Wash. 2001), struck 
down a statute that banned credible “threats” “to do any . . . act which is intended to substantially harm 
the person threatened or another with respect to his or her . . . mental health.”  
100 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012); People v. Tran, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 650, 652–53 (Ct. App. 1996); Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 237–38 (Fla. 1995); Johnson v. 
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2. Knowingly False Statements About a Person.—Knowingly false 
statements about a person can generally be restricted (subject to the First 
Amendment mens rea requirements), whether they are defamatory or 
merely offensive because of their falsehood.101 
Several harassment cases have involved defendants impersonating 
their ex-girlfriends—either on websites or in responses to personal ads—
and saying, in this persona, that they are interested in casual sex.102 This can 
cause others to contact the ex-girlfriend in a distressing and frightening 
way, and could also unfairly damage her reputation. Such statements can 
likewise be punished as a form of libel. 
To be sure, the libel exception generally arises these days in civil 
damages lawsuits, and some courts have held that injunctions against libel 
are unconstitutional.103 But the emerging majority view seems to be that “an 
injunction issued following a trial that determined that the defendant defamed 
the plaintiff that does no more than prohibit the defendant from repeating the 
defamation, is not a prior restraint and does not offend the First 
Amendment.”104 (Preliminary injunctions against libel—entered before a full 
trial and based only on a finding of likelihood of success on the merits—are 
likely not constitutional, for reasons my coauthor Mark Lemley and I have 
explained elsewhere; I will set such preliminary injunctions aside for purposes 
of this Article.)105 
Likewise, the Court in Garrison v. Louisiana suggested that criminal 
libel laws that are limited to knowingly or recklessly false statements are 
constitutional,106 and criminal libel laws seem to be enforced with some 
 
State, 449 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. 1994); Johnson v. State, 648 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); State 
v. Rucker, 987 P.2d 1080, 1094–95 (Kan. 1999); Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533 
(Va. Ct. App. 1994). 
101 Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253–54 (1974) (concluding that civil liability 
for offensive knowing falsehoods was constitutional); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967) 
(likewise); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (suggesting that criminal liability for 
defamatory knowing falsehoods was constitutional); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 
(1964) (concluding that civil liability for defamatory knowing falsehoods was constitutional). 
102 United States v. Sayer, Nos. 2:11-CR-113-DBH, 2:11-CR-47-DBH, 2012 WL 1714746 (D. Me. 
May 15, 2012); People v. Kochanowski, 719 N.Y.S.2d 461 (App. Term 2000); People v. Johnson, 617 
N.Y.S.2d 577 (App. Div. 1994). 
103 See, e.g., Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155, 1157 (Pa. 1978) (holding that permanent 
injunctions against libelous speech are forbidden by the Pennsylvania Constitution); Lemley & Volokh, 
supra note 51, at 178–79 (noting other cases that take this view). 
104 Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 343 (Cal. 2007); see also id. at 343–52 
(discussing similar decisions from other courts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623 special note on 
remedies for defamation other than damages (1977) (stating that an injunction may be available when a court 
has “formally determined” that the speech is unprotected).  
105 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 51, at 169–79; see also Balboa Island, 156 P.3d at 347–52 
(citing state court decisions stating that preliminary injunctions against libel are generally unconstitutional, 
even if permanent injunctions are allowed). 
106 379 U.S. at 75. 
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regularity in a few states at the trial level. One recent study reports on 61 
criminal libel prosecutions in Wisconsin from 1991 to 2007,107 and a search 
through Virginia criminal records reveals more than 300 criminal libel or 
slander convictions from 1993 to 2008.108 It thus seems likely that criminal 
punishment for knowing falsehoods, whether through criminal libel statutes 
or “harassment” statutes, are constitutionally permissible. 
3. Knowingly False Statements About the Speaker, Used to 
Manipulate the Listener.—Knowing falsehoods were also 
involved in the infamous Lori Drew case. Drew, an adult woman, contacted 
Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old girl, who had been a classmate of Drew’s 
daughter.109 Drew pretended to be a sixteen-year-old boy and flirted with 
Meier over two weeks on the MySpace computer service. Meier apparently 
developed an emotional connection with the fictional sixteen-year-old boy: 
When Drew deliberately broke off contact, “tell[ing Meier] that he [(the 
fictional sixteen-year-old boy)] no longer liked her and that ‘the world 
would be a better place without her in it,’” Meier killed herself.110 Drew 
apparently deliberately tried to distress Meier—she had a grudge against 
her because of Meier’s interaction with Drew’s daughter—though there 
was no allegation that she actually wanted Meier to kill herself. 
Drew was then prosecuted for violating the MySpace terms of service 
by using a fictional identity, which prosecutors claimed was not merely a 
breach of contract but a criminal misuse of a computer system. The court 
threw out the charges because it concluded that a breach of the terms of 
service didn’t suffice to turn ordinary use of a computer into a crime.111 
But Drew could have been convicted, I think, under a law that 
specifically banned using knowing falsehoods about oneself in order to 
severely distress a minor, if such a law had existed. Following United 
States v. Alvarez, there seem to be five votes on the Supreme Court for the 
proposition that knowing lies can generally be restricted by laws that pass 
intermediate scrutiny—that are substantially related to an important 
government interest.112 And a ban on these sorts of manipulative lies that 
are intended to cause severe distress to an especially vulnerable class of 
victims should likely pass this test.113 
 
107 David Pritchard, Rethinking Criminal Libel: An Empirical Study, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 303 
313 (2009). 
108 Westlaw search through CRIM-VA for (libel slander). 
109 United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 468. 
112 See 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551–52 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Kagan, 
J.); see also id. at 2560–61 (Alito, J., dissenting, writing for three Justices) (concluding that knowing 
falsehoods should generally be constitutionally unprotected). 
113 See, e.g., id. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (seemingly endorsing laws that 
ban lies when there is “proof of specific harm to identifiable victims,” proof of a “context[] in which a 
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Moreover, the boundaries of such a law would have well fit what made 
Drew’s scheme especially dangerous and culpable. Had Drew revealed her 
identity up front, it’s unlikely that Meier would have let herself be 
emotionally manipulated by Drew. And had the incident involved a 
genuine other teenage boy who toyed with the affections of a teenage 
girl—even one three years younger than himself and even out of desire for 
petty revenge—then it seems to me that the case for punishing the boy 
would have been quite weak. While his conduct would have still been 
reprehensible and tragic, emotional manipulation aimed at producing 
heartbreak isn’t and shouldn’t itself be a crime, even in the tiny fraction of 
cases in which it leads to suicide. 
It’s not clear to me that the fortunately rare incidents such as the Drew 
case warrant enacting laws that prohibit such manipulative lies. But if 
legislatures want to do something about these incidents, a law narrowly 
focused on manipulative lies about one’s own identity aimed at minors 
should be constitutional. 
4. Incitement and Solicitation.—Speech that is intended to promote 
imminent and likely criminal conduct is constitutionally unprotected.114 So 
is speech that is intended to solicit a particular crime, even when the crime 
is not supposed to take place imminently. The boundaries of this 
solicitation exception are not clear, but it seems likely that it will cover 
statements that intentionally urge people to attack a particular person or to 
vandalize a particular building.115 
Nonetheless, such speech is unprotected only if it really is intended to 
promote violence. That speech harshly criticizes its target does not strip it 
of protection, even if some listeners might react to the speech by attacking 
or threatening the target. Thus, for instance, in NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., the NAACP organized a black boycott of white-owned 
stores and publicized the names of blacks who weren’t following the 
boycott in order to pressure people into going along with the boycott. Some 
 
tangible harm to others is especially likely to occur,” or proof that the lie is of a sort that is “particularly 
likely to produce harm”). 
 Whether the same principle should apply to emotionally manipulative lies about oneself aimed at 
adults is hard to tell, given the vagueness of the intermediate scrutiny test. For a case holding that such 
lies said to adults are not civilly actionable and therefore not reaching the question whether such lies are 
constitutionally protected, see Bonhomme v. St. James, 970 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2012). Bonhomme, like Drew, 
arose in the context of online impersonation that lured an unsuspecting victim into an emotional 
relationship; fortunately, the case didn’t lead to suicide, though the plaintiff claimed that it did cause 
severe depression. 
114 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
115 Compare United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (solicitation of child pornography is 
constitutionally unprotected), with Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107–09 (1973) (per curiam) 
(statement by a demonstrator, as an illegal demonstration was being cleared up, that “We’ll take the 
fucking street later” is constitutionally protected even if seen as “advocacy of illegal action at some 
indefinite future time”). 
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of the people whose names were so publicized were beaten, had their 
property vandalized, or had shots fired into their homes.116 But despite this, 
the Court held that the NAACP and the people who participated in 
gathering and publicizing the names couldn’t be held liable for the 
boycott.117 
One recent injunction against speech about a particular person seemed 
to be justified by a concern that the speech led some readers to threaten the 
person whom the speech criticized. In Kimberlin v. Walker, political 
activist (and convicted bomber) Brett Kimberlin claimed that blogger 
Aaron Walker’s harsh criticisms of Kimberlin led some readers to send 
threats to Kimberlin and his family; and the judge relied on this in ordering 
Walker to stop blogging about Kimberlin.118 Nor was the judge (Judge 
Vaughey) impressed by the First Amendment argument: 
JUDGE VAUGHEY: [Y]ou are starting a conflagration, for lack of a better 
      word, and you’re just letting the thing go recklessly no 
      matter where it goes. 
. . . . 
WALKER:   But Your Honor, I did not incite [the reader who allegedly 
     threatened Kimberlin] within the Brandenburg standard. 
JUDGE VAUGHEY: Well, forget Brandenburg. Let’s go by Vaughey right 
     now, and common sense out in the world.119 
Fortunately, the reviewing court in this case apparently did not forget 
Brandenburg, and vacated the order prohibiting Walker from further 
blogging about Kimberlin.120 And this is the correct result: If speakers 
could be ordered to stop criticizing their subjects whenever any of their 
thousands of readers threatened the subject (or were alleged to have 
threatened the subject), a vast range of criticism would be potentially 
suppressible. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and Brandenburg preclude 
that.121 
C. Speech About a Person that Allegedly Invades “Privacy” 
Sometimes, harassment prosecutions and restraining orders are based 
on speech that allegedly invades people’s privacy. Are these justifiable 
 
116 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 904–05 (1982). 
117 Id. at 925–26.  
118 See Hearing at 55, Kimberlin v. Walker, No. 0601SP019792012 (Md. Dist. Ct. May 29, 2012). 
119 Id. 
120 Order of Denial of Petition for Peace Order, Kimberlin v. Walker, No. 8526D (Md. Cir. Ct. July 
5, 2012), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/crimharass/99246349-Peace-Order-Vacated-7-5-
12.pdf. 
121 Allegations that public criticism of a person led some readers to threaten the person also arose 
in Nilan v. Valenti, No. 12 27RO 235 (Mass. Dist. Ct. June 27, 2012), available at http://www.volokh.
com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/nilanorder.png. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
756 
based on a possible “invasion of privacy” exception to the First 
Amendment? 
This question most clearly arises under Minnesota and North Dakota 
law but could also come up elsewhere. Minnesota law lets judges enjoin 
“repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures 
that . . . are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, 
security, or privacy of another.”122 A Minnesota court has upheld the statute 
because it is limited to what the court saw as constitutionally unprotected 
speech: “fighting words,” “true threats,” and “conduct that intrudes on the 
privacy of another.”123 
North Dakota law uses similar language, making it a crime to 
intentionally or recklessly “[e]ngage[] in harassing conduct by means of 
intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that are intended to adversely 
affect the safety, security, or privacy of another person.”124 And even in 
other states, a law that immunizes “constitutionally protected activity” 
could be read by a court as limited to speech that falls within a First 
Amendment exception125—which would then raise the question whether 
there is such an exception for speech that “invades privacy.” 
Now “privacy” is a famously flexible word, and the Minnesota 
decision cited above seemed to speak of privacy in the sense of freedom 
from intrusion into one’s home, citing a leading telephone harassment 
case.126 Intrusions on privacy could also include clandestine surveillance 
and the distribution of the results of such surveillance by the person who 
was doing the surveilling. The Tyler Clementi tragedy, in which a 
roommate secretly recorded Clementi kissing another man and distributed 
the recording online, which apparently led Clementi to commit suicide, 
would be a prominent example. Indeed, the roommate, Dharun Ravi, was 
convicted for violating the New Jersey invasion of privacy statute, which 
barred unauthorized disclosure of recordings of people who are engaged in 
sexual conduct.127 
But “privacy” could also refer to a right not to have others say certain 
things about you. Indeed, one Minnesota appellate decision and two trial 
court decisions (later reversed on other grounds) took this view: 
 
122 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748, subdivs. 1(a)(1), (4)(a), (5)(a), (6) (West 2009 & Supp. 2013). 
123 Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 565–66 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
124 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01.1(h) (2012). 
125 See infra Part II.D. 
126 Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 565 (citing Gormley v. Dir., Conn. State Dep’t of Prob., 632 F.2d 938, 
942 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
127 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9(b) (West 2005); Indictment counts 1, 3, 5, & 7, State v. Ravi, No. 
11-04-00596 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Apr. 20, 2011); Ian Parker, The Story of a Suicide, NEW 
YORKER, Feb. 6, 2012, at 36; Kate Zernike, 30-Day Term for Spying on Roommate at Rutgers, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 22, 2012, at A1. Ravi was also charged with obstruction of justice and with committing the 
crime in order to intimidate Clementi based on Clementi’s sexual orientation or knowing that Clementi 
would be thus intimidated. Indictment, supra, at counts 2, 4, 6 & 8–15. 
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• Johnson v. Arlotta concluded that defendant’s “blogging and 
communications to third parties” about his ex-girlfriend could be 
enjoined on the grounds that they interfered with her “privacy,” 
regardless of “their truth or falsity.”128 
• Faricy v. Schramm concluded that defendant’s sending a letter to 
his son’s Catholic school alleging that the son’s grade school 
math teacher129 was gay, and implying that the teacher should be 
fired as a result,130 constituted “harassment,” and enjoined such 
speech for the future.131 (The court of appeals reversed on the 
grounds that the statute applied only to repeated incidents, and the 
letter was a single incident.)132 
• Beahrs v. Lake concluded that it was “harassment” for a fired 
employee to retaliate against his ex-employer by sending 
“photocopies of public documents” “to more than 60 of [the ex-
employer’s] personal and business acquaintances.”133 The public 
documents were mostly related to the ex-employer’s past minor 
misconduct, including a document evidencing the ex-employer’s 
guilty plea to driving under the influence, a tax lien against the 
ex-employer, and a police report describing how one of the ex-
employer’s employees “had been cited for selling a cigar to an 
underage decoy during a tobacco compliance check.”134 (The 
court of appeals reversed on the grounds that the ex-employer 
 
128 No. A11–630, 2011 WL 6141651, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2011). The Johnson opinion 
did express concern that the statements were indirect attempts to contact the ex-girlfriend and not just 
speech about her. But the appellate court affirmed the trial court order that specifically directed 
defendant to “remove his blog [about the ex-girlfriend] from the Internet.” Id. at *2. And the appellate 
court believed defendant’s misconduct rested in part on his sending “extremely personal, sensitive 
information about” the ex-girlfriend to third parties and “shar[ing] sensitive information about [the ex-
girlfriend] in a manner that substantially and adversely impacted her privacy interests.” Id. at *3, *5. 
129 Statement of the Case of Appellant at 4–5, Faricy v. Schramm, No. C8-02-0689 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Apr. 29, 2002), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/FaricyvSchramm.pdf. 
130 No. C8-02-0689, 2002 WL 31500913 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2001). The defendant’s 
evidence that plaintiff was gay was rather odd: 
Schramm based his suspicion on the fact that Faricy’s car displays an Apple Computer decal and 
that Faricy “lives or has lived . . . in a neighborhood that has a higher population of 
homosexuals.” Schramm had determined Faricy’s place of residence through an internet search. 
Schramm contended in the letter that “both wearing a rainbow sticker on your car [and] living in a 
neighborhood where more homosexuals live is enough to send up a red flag.” 
Id. at *1. But the accuracy or inaccuracy of an allegation is irrelevant to the Minnesota statute. 
131 Restraining Order at 1, Faricy, No. C8-02-0689 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/FaricyvSchramm.pdf, at 13.  
132 Faricy, 2002 WL 31500913, at *2. 
133 No. C3-97-2222, 1998 WL 268075, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 26, 1998). 
134 Id. 
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“had no legitimate expectation of privacy” in “accurate copies of 
public records.”)135 
The appellate decisions in Faricy and Beahrs didn’t deny that speech about 
a person might be covered by the privacy prong of the state statute. The 
reasoning in Beahrs suggests that the statute might apply to mailings of 
embarrassing information that is not in public records. And the decision in 
Johnson expressly concludes that speech that reveals embarrassing facts 
about a person can be labeled “harassment” and lead to a restraining 
order.136 
The Supreme Court, however, has never recognized a First 
Amendment exception for speech that discloses supposedly private 
information about another. Some First Amendment cases have allowed 
restrictions justified by an interest in protecting privacy, but these have all 
involved privacy in the sense of freedom from intrusion into a private 
place, generally the home.137 And a line of cases culminating in Florida 
Star v. B.J.F., which set aside restrictions on revealing the names of rape 
victims and juvenile offenders,138 shows that privacy-based restrictions on 
speech about another person are often unconstitutional. 
The “disclosure of private facts” tort remains recognized by most 
lower courts. But the logic of the Court’s cases casts some doubt on it; the 
dissent in Florida Star warned that the majority opinion 
“obliterate[s] . . . the tort of the publication of private facts”139—“[e]ven if 
the Court’s opinion does not say as much today, such obliteration will 
follow inevitably from the Court’s conclusion here.”140 A few judges have 
indeed rejected this tort based partly on free speech concerns141 (a view I 
 
135 Id.  
136 Johnson v. Arlotta, No. A11-630, 2011 WL 6141651 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2011). Likewise, 
in Tarlan v. Sorensen, No. C2-98-1900, 1999 WL 243567 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 1999), the plaintiff 
wife sought a restraining order on the grounds that the defendant husband “released [plaintiff wife’s] 
medical records without her permission.” Id. at *2. The appellate court affirmed the denial of a 
restraining order but concluded that “while both parties have said inappropriate things about each other 
in front of, or to their employees, neither party’s conduct rose to the level necessary to require the 
issuance of a harassment restraining order under Minn.Stat. § 609.748.” Id. The court’s reasoning seems 
to be that revelations of private information about others might be actionable under the statute if more 
egregious than that present in the case—for instance, if the information wasn’t just revealed to a few 
employees. 
137 See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 
748 & n.27 (1978); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970). 
138 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 
(1979); Oklahoma Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court in & for Oklahoma County, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Cox 
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
139 491 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting). 
140 Id. 
141 See Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 693 (Ind. 1997) (splitting 2–2–1 on whether the 
tort should be recognized, with one justice expressing no opinion); id. at 695 (Dickson, J., concurring); 
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have supported in detail elsewhere142), and those courts that recognize the 
tort have tended to read it narrowly, especially in recent years.143 
Moreover, it isn’t clear whether state statutes that prohibit speech 
“intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another” are 
meant to incorporate the disclosure tort or were intended to cover 
something different, whether broader or narrower. The orthodox definition 
of the tort, given by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is that: 
 One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another 
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter 
publicized is of a kind that 
 (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
 (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.144 
 [Comment a.] “Publicity[]” . . . means that the matter is made public, by 
communicating it [orally, in writing, or otherwise] to the public at large, or to 
so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to 
become one of public knowledge. . . . 
 Thus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy, within the rule stated in 
this Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff’s private life to a 
single person or even to a small group of persons. On the other hand, any 
publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small circulation, or in a 
handbill distributed to a large number of persons, or any broadcast over the 
radio, or statement made in an address to a large audience, is sufficient to give 
publicity within the meaning of the term as it is used in this Section.145 
Thus, even speech that “adversely affect[s]” another’s privacy is not 
tortious if it’s “of legitimate concern to the public,” or if it is said “to a 
small group of persons” (including those persons, such as the subject’s 
friends or family members, from whom the subject most wants to keep the 
matter secret).146 So it might well be that the legislature understood the 
harassment statutes as covering more than just what is covered by the 
 
Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 715 (N.C. 1988); see also Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Cos., 712 P.2d 803 
(Or. 1986) (rejecting the tort without reaching the free speech questions). 
142 For my criticism of the disclosure tort, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information 
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1049 (2000). 
143 See, e.g., Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 485 (Cal. 1998) (confining the tort to 
“extreme cases” because of First Amendment concerns). 
144 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
145 Id. cmt. a. 
146 A few jurisdictions depart from this requirement and impose liability even for disclosures to 
individual recipients. See, e.g., McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) 
(purporting to apply Kentucky law); Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 723 N.E.2d 1192, 1197 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2000); Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Bradley v. 
Bd. of Educ., 565 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1997); Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 864 (R.I. 1997) 
(applying R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (1997), which omits the publicity requirement). 
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disclosure tort. On the other hand, as noted above, it’s also possible that the 
reference to privacy was meant to cover only intrusion into private places 
and not disclosure of supposedly private facts. 
Indeed, the one Minnesota decision I could find that considered 
whether the “adversely affect[s] . . . privacy” language follows the 
disclosure tort said that it did not: Olson v. LaBrie concluded that the 
harassment and restraining order statutes do not incorporate the disclosure 
tort, or any of the other privacy torts, because “[h]arassment is defined in 
the statute, providing no need to look beyond the statute to tort caselaw to 
define harassment.”147 Yet the statute defines harassment as “repeated 
incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a 
substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse 
effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another,”148 which requires a 
definition of what constitutes “a substantial adverse effect on . . . 
privacy”—a definition that neither the statute nor Minnesota case law 
provides. 
In any event, trying to clarify harassment laws by incorporating the 
disclosure tort poses problems of its own. Because the disclosure tort was 
developed as a civil cause of action—and a cause of action chiefly aimed at 
newspapers—it’s in many ways a poor fit for criminal harassment laws. 
To begin with, the “of legitimate concern to the public” standard is 
famously vague. The term requires a normative judgment that different 
people will likely make differently, and lower court cases haven’t made the 
matter particularly clear, especially since the judgment is so fact-specific. 
Whether or not a statement about a person’s being homosexual, being 
transsexual,149 having an affair, suffering from an illness, owing a debt, and 
so on is “of legitimate concern” depends heavily on who the person is, 
what controversies he is involved in, what has been said about the 
allegations by others, and so on. As a result, it’s unlikely that precedents 
will do much to clear up the uncertainty of the standard. 
Even if such a vague standard is a permissible basis for civil liability, 
it may not be permissible when criminal punishment is involved.150 And 
that the statutes require a purpose to invade privacy doesn’t solve the 
vagueness problem because the vagueness lies in determining what 
constitutes invasion of privacy for purposes of the law. 
To be sure, there is a similarly normative value-of-the-speech standard 
that is used in criminal cases: the obscenity law exclusion of speech that 
 
147 No. A11–558, 2012 WL 426585, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2012). 
148 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748 subdiv. 1(a)(1) (West 2009 & Supp. 2013). 
149 Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a 
reasonable jury could conclude that publishing the fact that the first woman student body president at a 
community college was a transsexual wasn’t “newsworthy” and was therefore actionable under the 
disclosure tort). 
150 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997). 
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has “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”151 But the 
definition of obscenity is hardly a great success story of First Amendment 
jurisprudence. Modern obscenity law has avoided posing a grave threat to 
free speech only because it has in practice been read quite narrowly, and in 
particular has been limited to the sort of hard-core pornography that is very 
distantly removed from the communication of facts or ideas, whether on 
public topics or private topics. 
Indeed, in recent years, the Court has refused to recognize new speech 
restrictions by analogy to obscenity law. In United States v. Stevens, the 
Court expressly rejected the theory that an exception for speech with 
“serious value” could save a ban on distribution of depictions of animal 
cruelty.152 In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Court refused to 
expand the obscenity-for-minors category to cover depictions of violence 
as well as sex, concluding that an exception for speech with serious value 
“does not suffice” to validate laws other than obscenity laws.153 And a two-
Justice concurrence expressly noted the unacceptable vagueness of a 
“serious value” test when it is applied outside the area of pornography.154 
It’s also not clear how the disclosure tort applies to Facebook and 
other social media used by people to communicate with their 
acquaintances.155 The tort, which was developed largely with the news 
media in mind, was never understood as keeping people from telling each 
other about developments in their social circle, whether these had to do 
with sexual behavior, disease, or financial setbacks. 
Such gossip is commonplace. It often has significant value to the 
participants because it tells people who in their social circle is potentially 
untrustworthy or even dangerous. And restricting such speech would often 
affect people’s ability to discuss their own lives: If you want to explain to 
your friends why you’re depressed, or why you’ve broken up with 
someone, or why you’re moving out of town or taking another job, you 
 
151 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
152 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (“In Miller [v. California,] we held that ‘serious’ value shields 
depictions of sex from regulation as obscenity. . . . We did not, however, determine that serious value 
could be used as a general precondition to protecting other types of speech in the first place. Most of 
what we say to one another lacks ‘religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or 
artistic value’ (let alone serious value), but it is still sheltered from government regulation.”). 
153 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011). 
154 Id. at 2746 (Alito, J., concurring). 
155 For an example of a request for a restraining order based on alleged privacy invasions on 
Facebook, see Olson v. LaBrie, No. A11–558, 2012 WL 426585 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2012). The 
Olson court concluded that the Minnesota statute’s prohibition on actions that “have a substantial 
adverse effect” on another’s privacy should not be interpreted using tort law principles, and concluded 
that the speech there—“innocuous family photos” coupled with “mean and disrespectful” comments 
didn’t substantially affect privacy. Id. at *3. But if a court concluded that a harassment statute should be 
read in terms of the disclosure tort, and the speech did indeed deal with private matters, the court would 
have to decide whether Facebook posts constitute sufficient publicity to be civilly actionable and 
therefore (by hypothesis) enjoinable and criminally punishable. 
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might need to tell them about your husband’s cheating, your ex-boyfriend’s 
sexually transmitted disease, your ex-girlfriend’s impending bankruptcy, or 
even your mother’s dementia.156 
For all these reasons, the tort has generally required “publicity” in the 
sense of communication beyond a small group of personal acquaintances. 
But today, much of this speech has moved online, especially to sites such 
as Facebook. And the publicity requirement, developed in a time when 
people could either talk to a few people orally or to many thousands in a 
newspaper, does not offer much guidance about whether talking to one’s 
circle of several dozen (or even several hundred) Facebook “friends” 
counts as publicity. 
As I’ve argued elsewhere, privacy concerns might suffice to justify 
narrow restrictions on clearly defined kinds of speech that very rarely have 
value—public or private—to listeners or speakers. Nude photos or sex 
tapes might be one example.157 Social security numbers might be another.158 
But a broad and vague criminal prohibition on speech that invades privacy 
ought not be constitutional. 
D. General Statutory Exceptions for “Constitutionally Protected Activity” 
Some stalking and cyberharassment statutes expressly exempt 
“constitutionally protected activity.” For instance, D.C. law provides: 
 (a) It is [a crime] for a person to purposefully engage in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific individual [that intentionally, knowingly, or 
negligently] cause[s] that individual [reasonably] to . . . [s]uffer [significant 
mental suffering or distress that may, but does not necessarily, require medical 
or other professional treatment or counseling] . . . . 
 (b) This section does not apply to constitutionally protected activity.159 
 
 156  Sonja R. West, The Story of Me: The Underprotection of Autobiographical Speech, 84 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 905, 907–11 (2006) (discussing how a person’s autobiographical speech about herself will 
often need to mention others). 
157 Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy, supra note 142, at 1094; see, e.g., 
Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. 2003) (discussing jury verdict for plaintiff whose ex-husband 
had distributed nude photographs of plaintiff); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 
(Minn. 1998) (stating that disclosure of nude photographs would generally be actionable). 
158 See, e.g., Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 280, 285–86 (4th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that private 
persons who make public records available could be required to redact social security numbers, but not so 
long as the government itself fails to redact such information on its own sites); Eugene Volokh, Crime-
Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1146 (2005). 
159 D.C. CODE § 22-3133 (LexisNexis 2010); see also, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709(a), 
(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012) (making it a crime to, among other things, “with intent to harass, annoy 
or alarm another,” “communicate[] . . . about such other person any lewd, lascivious, threatening or 
obscene words, language, drawings or caricatures,” but excluding “any constitutionally protected 
activity”). 
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 “To engage in a course of conduct” means directly or indirectly, or through 
one or more third persons, in person or by any means, on 2 or more occasions, 
to: 
 (A) Follow, monitor, place under surveillance, threaten, or communicate to 
or about another individual; [or] 
  . . . . 
 (C) Use another individual’s personal identifying information [defined to 
include a person’s name].160 
Does this express exemption of “constitutionally protected activity” save 
the statute from being unconstitutionally overbroad? And, relatedly, what 
exactly does this exemption mean? 
“Constitutionally protected activity” and “constitutionally protected 
speech” are not clearly defined terms. One important difficulty is that First 
Amendment cases generally ask whether a particular law restricting speech 
is constitutionally permissible, not whether a particular kind of speech is 
constitutionally protected. The same speech might be constitutionally 
protected against one law but not against another. 
Picketing fifty feet from a person’s house, for instance, is 
constitutionally protected against content-based restrictions.161 Such 
picketing is also constitutionally protected against a content-neutral 
restriction on picketing within three hundred feet of a house.162 But it may 
or may not be constitutionally protected against a content-neutral restriction 
on picketing within fifty feet of a house.163 Likewise, Cohen’s wearing a 
“Fuck the Draft” jacket in a courthouse was speech constitutionally 
protected against punishment under a disturbing the peace law.164 But it’s 
not clear whether it would be constitutionally protected against punishment 
under a narrower law limited to vulgarities in courthouses.165 
 
160 D.C. CODE § 22-3132(8). 
161 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). I use 50 feet as an example here; the Court hasn’t made 
clear how wide a bubble zone around a house can be set by a content-neutral rule, though it has said that 
a 300-foot zone is too wide. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
162 Madsen, 512 U.S. 753; Ramsey v. Edgepark, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 443, 452 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) 
(upholding injunction against picketing in front of plaintiffs’ homes but striking down ban on picketing 
within 200 yards of plaintiffs’ homes); see also Welsh v. Johnson, 508 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1993) (pre-Madsen case upholding a ban on appearing within two blocks of plaintiff’s house, 
reasoning that, “[a]lthough at first blush a two-block restriction may seem possibly excessive in light of 
the constitutional interests in free speech and exercise of religion, it is clear that the trial judge’s 
knowledge of the configuration of streets in this rather secluded neighborhood rendered the limitation 
within the court’s discretion”). 
163 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
164 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).  
165 See id. at 19 (noting that the case didn’t involve a restriction limited to courthouses); see also 
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 685 (1992) (holding that viewpoint-
neutral and reasonable restrictions on speech in government buildings are generally constitutional). 
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Indeed, the premise of many defenses of criminal harassment laws is 
precisely that these laws may constitutionally punish even speech that 
would be protected against other laws.166 If those defenses are right, then 
perhaps no speech that intentionally annoys or harasses the subject is 
constitutionally protected when it is being punished through a harassment 
law or being restricted through a restraining order. 
With this in mind, we can identify at least two possible definitions of 
exempted “constitutionally protected speech,” matching two possible 
definitions of what constitutes constitutionally unprotected speech. 
First, “constitutionally [un]protected speech” might mean speech that 
fits within the existing recognized First Amendment exceptions for 
imminent illegal conduct, libel, obscenity, fighting words, and true threats. 
Other speech would be “constitutionally protected speech” or 
“constitutionally protected activity.” 
To be sure, such speech that’s not within an exception could still in 
some situations be restricted through content-neutral speech restrictions 
that pass the Ward v. Rock Against Racism test, or content-based speech 
restrictions that pass strict scrutiny. But it would still be “constitutionally 
protected speech” and thus exempted from the D.C. statute. So, for 
instance, under this interpretation, residential picketing immediately 
outside a person’s home would not be covered by the statute because it 
would be “constitutionally protected activity” (absent some threats or 
fighting words or defamation by the picketers). And this would be so even 
though the residential picketing could have been restricted by a narrow 
content-neutral residential picketing ban.167 
Under such an interpretation of the D.C. statute, the statute would be 
constitutional. It wouldn’t be unconstitutionally overbroad because it would 
apply only to speech that fits within the existing exception.168 And it 
wouldn’t be unconstitutionally vague because—as so interpreted—the 
statute would be a combination of a criminal libel statute, a threat statute, a 
fighting words statute, and the like, though limited to situations where the 
defendant made at least two statements and purposefully, knowingly, or 
negligently caused “significant mental suffering or distress.”169 
Second, an exception for “constitutionally protected activity” might be 
read as an exception only for activity that the statute can’t constitutionally 
 
166 See, e.g., Wallace v. Van Pelt, 969 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
167 See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486. 
168 See, e.g., O’Brien v. Borowski, 961 N.E.2d 547, 554–57 (Mass. 2012) (interpreting the state 
harassment prevention order statute as limited to the constitutionally unprotected categories of “fighting 
words” and threats, though doing so even in the absence of an express “constitutionally protected 
activity” exclusion). 
169 D.C. CODE § 22-3132(4) (LexisNexis 2010). The statute wouldn’t violate the rule of R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, because there is “no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.” 505 
U.S. 377, 390 (1992). 
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restrict. If the statute without this provision were found to, say, pass strict 
scrutiny as to all speech, then the provision wouldn’t protect any speech 
because (by hypothesis) no speech would qualify as “constitutionally 
protected” against this statute. If the statute without this provision were 
found to pass strict scrutiny as to speech about private figures but not as to 
speech about public figures, then the provision would protect only speech 
about public figures. If it were found to pass intermediate scrutiny when 
applied to residential picketing within fifty feet of a home but to fail 
intermediate scrutiny when applied to residential picketing more than fifty 
feet outside the home, then the provision would protect only residential 
picketing more than fifty feet outside the home. 
Under this reading, a “constitutionally protected activity” exemption 
would not affect the actual scope of the law. By definition, a mere statute 
cannot trump the Constitution and cannot ban “constitutionally protected 
activity” in the sense of activity that is protected against that statute by the 
Constitution. The provision would thus be no help to judges interpreting 
the terms of the law or to people who want to decide what the law bars 
them from doing. It would simply be a statement by the legislature that the 
legislature doesn’t mean to cover that speech or action that it isn’t allowed 
to cover. 
To be sure, the provision might have one substantive goal: to 
immunize the statute from a First Amendment overbreadth challenge by 
definitionally preventing the statute from being overbroad. An overbreadth 
challenge is a challenge to a statute on its face, not just as applied to the 
challenger. The challenger is arguing that the statute is invalid as to 
everyone because it covers a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected speech.170 By expressly stating that the statute doesn’t apply to 
constitutionally protected speech, the enactors of the law might have 
wanted to preclude such a finding of overbreadth. 
But such an attempt to immunize a statute from overbreadth scrutiny 
can’t work, precisely because it would deny citizens the benefits that the 
overbreadth doctrine provides. 
The overbreadth doctrine recognizes that when a statute on its face 
seems to apply to a wide range of constitutionally protected speech, the 
existence of the statute deters such constitutionally protected speech.171 
Even people who believe their speech will ultimately be found to be 
constitutionally protected, and who thus think they have a good First 
Amendment defense to the statute, may reasonably worry that they will be 
prosecuted and even convicted under the statute before they ultimately 
prevail in court. Defendants—even ones whose own speech might be 
punishable by a narrower statute—are thus allowed to raise the overbreadth 
 
170 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010). 
171 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975). 
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of a statute in trying to get the statute struck down on its face, so that this 
“chilling effect” caused by the overbroad statute is eliminated.172 
A tautological statement that a statute shouldn’t be read to cover 
constitutionally protected activity does nothing to mitigate the chilling 
effect posed by the statute’s facial overbreadth. Despite such an exclusion 
of constitutionally protected activity, even people who believe their speech 
will ultimately be found to be constitutionally protected, and who thus 
think they have a good statutory defense under that clause, may reasonably 
worry that they will be prosecuted and even convicted under the statute 
before they ultimately prevail in court. 
To prevent this, people have to still be able to raise the overbreadth of 
the statute—notwithstanding the statutory “constitutionally protected 
activity” exception—in trying to get the statute struck down on its face so 
that this chilling effect is minimized. In the words of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, “a savings clause that provides that conduct protected by 
the state or federal constitutions is not a crime under this section” “cannot 
substantively operate to save an otherwise invalid statute.”173 
Another way of reaching the same result is through the void-for-
vagueness doctrine.174 First Amendment doctrine is complicated and 
uncertain, especially once one reaches beyond the historically defined First 
Amendment exceptions (for incitement, obscenity, threats, fighting words, 
and defamation). The Court has never expressly defined what it takes for an 
interest to be “compelling” or even “substantial.” It has never decided 
whether there ought to be First Amendment exceptions for, say, speech that 
discloses private facts about another person or speech that uses another’s 
name without that person’s permission, and what the scope of those 
exceptions would be. A speaker who is considering whether her speech 
could get her sent to prison needs more guidance than that offered by an 
assurance that “constitutionally protected speech” is immunized from 
prosecution.175 
 
172 See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 555 (1993). 
173 State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415, 421 n.4 (Minn. 1998) (citing Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 
285, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). For a contrary, and I think incorrect, conclusion, see State v. 
Asmussen, 668 N.W.2d 725, 729–30 (S.D. 2003), which relied on the savings clause in upholding a ban 
on “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly” engaging in “a knowing and willful course of conduct 
directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and which serves 
no legitimate purpose,” except for “constitutionally protected activity.” But note that the “directed at a 
specific person” requirement in the South Dakota statute might mean that the statute is limited to one-
to-one speech and therefore constitutional, see supra Part I; and indeed, the speech involved in the 
Asmussen case was one-to-one. 
174 See M. Katherine Boychuk, Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad?, 
88 NW. U. L. REV. 769, 788 (1994) (“[A]n exception for constitutionally protected activities . . . does 
not mitigate the vagueness of the law . . . because it does not provide specific guidelines that narrow the 
scope of the offending behavior.”). 
175 See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-29, at 1031 (2d ed. 
1988) (arguing that a hypothetical statute that reads, “It shall be a crime to say anything in public unless 
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And this vagueness also has the effect of making the law overbroad. 
What the Court held in Reno v. ACLU about a ban on speech that is 
“indecent” and “patently offensive” (even when limited to “sexual or 
excretory activities or organs”) is equally true here: A law that covers 
otherwise protected speech but excludes constitutionally protected activity 
still has an unacceptable “chilling effect,” poses a substantial “threat of 
censoring speech that, in fact, falls outside the statute’s scope,” and 
“unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled 
to constitutional protection.”176 
So of these two interpretations of the “constitutionally protected 
activity” clause, the second, broader interpretation poses serious 
constitutional problems (and is indeed, I believe, unconstitutional). The 
better approach then is to use the first, narrower interpretation.177 Under this 
interpretation, a statute that excludes “constitutionally protected speech” or 
“constitutionally protected activity” would cover only speech that falls 
within the existing, well-established First Amendment exceptions (such as 
incitement, threats, fighting words, and libel).178 It would not cover speech 
that falls outside those exceptions. 
E. Content-Based Speech Restrictions 
Once we get outside the First Amendment exceptions, harassment 
laws that cover one-to-many speech should not be constitutional. Indeed, 
this is precisely what some state supreme courts have held in limiting their 
 
the speech is protected by the first and fourteenth amendments,” “simply exchanges overbreadth for 
[unconstitutional] vagueness”). “[T]he premise underlying any instance of facial invalidation for 
overbreadth must be that the Constitution does not, in and of itself, provide a bright enough line to 
guide primary conduct, and that a law whose reach into protected spheres is limited only by the 
background assurance that unconstitutional applications will eventually be set aside is a law that will 
deter too much that is in fact protected.” Id. 
176 521 U.S. 844, 871, 872, 874 (1997). 
177 See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 577 (1988) (holding that statutes should be interpreted, when possible, to avoid serious 
constitutional problems). 
178 The D.C. statute’s coverage of speech that only negligently causes significant distress does not 
make the statute unconstitutional under this interpretation. The speech would still have to constitute 
incitement, threats, fighting words, or libel—with the mens rea requirements that those exceptions 
mandate—in order to be punishable. Given that all such speech is already constitutionally unprotected, 
punishing only that speech that fits within those doctrines and also negligently causes significant mental 
distress would only narrow the scope of potential punishment. So, for instance, if someone is 
prosecuted under the statute for saying knowing falsehoods about a public figure on a matter of public 
concern in a way that negligently caused significant mental distress to that person, the prosecution 
would still have to prove the speaker’s knowledge or recklessness about the falsity of the statements—
in order to make the speech into “constitutionally [un]protected activity”—even though it would only 
have to prove negligence as to the causing of significant mental distress. 
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stalking or harassment laws to speech that fits within the First Amendment 
exceptions.179 
1. Generally.—To begin with, all the restrictions I describe here are 
content-based speech restrictions. Many expressly target speech based on 
content: Consider, for instance, the Washington statute that makes it a 
crime to, “with intent to harass, intimidate, torment, or embarrass any other 
person, . . . mak[e] an electronic communication to such other person or a 
third party . . . [u]sing any lewd, lascivious, indecent, or obscene words, 
images, or language.”180 Likewise, consider the Berea, Ohio order that 
“[Joanna Hamrick] is prohibited from posting any information/comments/
threats/or any other data on any internet site, regarding the petitioner and 
any member of her immediate or extended family.”181 
Some of the statutes don’t mention content but punish speech or 
conduct done with the intent to “annoy,” “harass,” or cause “substantial 
emotional distress,” e.g., “with purpose to harass another” “mak[ing] . . . a 
communication . . . [in any] manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.”182 
Yet when the communication causes annoyance because of its offensive 
content, rather than for other reasons (for instance, because it causes a 
 
179 See, e.g., O’Brien v. Borowski, 961 N.E.2d 547, 554–57 (Mass. 2012) (interpreting the state 
harassment prevention order statute as limited to the constitutionally unprotected categories of “fighting 
words” and threats); sources cited supra note 100. 
180 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260(1) (West 2010). 
181 See Order of Protection at 3, Kleem v. Hamrick, No. CV 11 761954 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 
15, 2011), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/KleemvHamrickOrder.pdf. 
Some courts have reasoned that harassment laws restrict “the manner and means” of speech—e.g., an 
unwanted telephone call—“rather than [the] content.” State v. Anonymous, 389 A.2d 1270, 1273 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1978); see also, e.g., State v. Brown, 85 P.3d 109, 112–13, 114 n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2004) (reasoning that “criminal liability under the statute is based on the ‘manner’ in which certain 
communication is conveyed and the underlying purpose for the communication” and that it therefore 
does not “regulate[] speech on the basis of its content”); State v. Neames, 377 So. 2d 1018, 1022 (La. 
1979) (Summers, C.J., dissenting) (“When the caller uses the phone, not to convey a message but to 
repeatedly annoy another, the rights of the recipient are abused. Because of this it is not the 
communication which the statute punishes but, instead, the manner in which it is exercised.”). But this 
is not the case when a communication is found to be “likely to cause annoyance or alarm” precisely 
because of what it says, rather than (say) its waking someone up in the middle of the night. Anonymous, 
389 A.2d at 1273. And the fact that a content-based restriction applies only to some media or some 
places doesn’t keep it from being content based. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 
505 U.S. 123, 135–36 (1992) (concluding that a content-based permit fee for demonstrations was 
unconstitutional); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 458–59 (1980) (likewise as to a content-based ban on 
residential picketing); Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (likewise as to a content-based 
ban on picketing outside schools). 
182 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-4 (West 2005). John B. Major, Note, Cyberstalking, Twitter, and the 
Captive Audience: A First Amendment Analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 144 
(2012), suggests that this focus on “the consequences of speech” rather than “the content of speech” 
may make such statutes content neutral; but for the reasons discussed in this subsection, I think that’s 
not right. 
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phone to ring in the middle of the night183), restricting such a 
communication because of its annoying content is a form of content-based 
speech restriction.184 
Indeed, many of the leading cases striking down restrictions on 
offensive speech involved laws that on their face didn’t mention content 
but focused on the offensive purpose and effect of the defendant’s 
behavior. Consider, for instance, Snyder v. Phelps185 and Hustler Magazine, 
Inc. v. Falwell,186 which relied on the First Amendment to reverse 
judgments for intentional infliction of emotional distress that were based on 
the content of speech. Though emotional distress tort claims are often 
based on speech, speech isn’t an element of the tort. Either speech or 
nonspeech conduct can be actionable if it recklessly or purposefully inflicts 
severe emotional distress through “outrageous” conduct. But when the 
distress and the outrageousness “turn[] on the content and viewpoint of the 
message conveyed”—when it is “what [defendant] said that exposed it to 
tort damages”—the application of the tort is treated as content based and 
therefore unconstitutional.187 
 
183 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.230(1)(b) (West 2010) (criminalizing, among other 
things, telephone calls made “at an extremely inconvenient hour”). 
184 See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A) (2006) (making it a crime to, “with the intent . . . to . . . cause 
substantial emotional distress to a person in another State . . . use[] the mail, any interactive computer 
service, or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a course of conduct that causes 
substantial emotional distress to that person”); United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 584 (D. 
Md. 2011) (“The portion of Section 2261A(2)(A) relied on in the Indictment amounts to a content-
based restriction because it limits speech on the basis of whether that speech is emotionally distressing 
to A.Z.”); State v. LaFontaine, 16 A.3d 1281, 1288 n.5, 1289 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (concluding that a 
telephone harassment prosecution of defendant who insulted his ex-wife’s lawyer was “on the basis of 
[defendant’s] speech” and therefore unconstitutional given the absence of a finding that the speech was 
an unprotected threat).  
 Asgian v. Schnorr, No. C1-96-622, 1996 WL 557410 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1996), reasoned that a 
restraining order barring all contact with a person was content neutral “because it prohibits all 
communication with respondent and serves purposes unrelated to the content of the expression,” 
namely “the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home.” Id. at *3 (quoting Welsh v. Johnson, 508 
N.W.2d 212, 215 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988))). But I 
think this is mistaken: The order was entered based on a finding that the person had engaged in speech 
that was seen as “an intentional invasion of privacy,” id. at *2, due to its content; repeated letters 
seeking donations to the university or offering supermarket coupons couldn’t have led to such an order, 
and the order was aimed at preventing the repetition of such intrusive, offensive, and frightening 
content. 
 The order, which barred future one-to-one contact, may well have been constitutional for the 
reasons described in Part I. But it was justified by the content of speech, not by content-neutral factors 
that were unrelated to the content. 
185 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
186 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
187 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218–19 (“The facts here are obviously quite different [from situations 
where targeted picketing restrictions are treated as content neutral] . . . . [A]ny distress occasioned by 
Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than any 
interference with the funeral itself.”); see also id. at 1218 (“To the extent [certain funeral picketing 
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Likewise, in Hess v. Indiana, Cohen v. California, Edwards v. South 
Carolina, Terminiello v. Chicago, and Cantwell v. Connecticut, defendants 
were found guilty of breach of the peace and disorderly conduct, crimes 
that cover nonspeech conduct as well as speech.188 Yet the Court focused on 
how the speech restrictions applied to the speech because of “the effect of 
[the speaker’s] communication upon his hearers”189 and reversed the 
convictions on those grounds.190 
Some courts have upheld the laws in part by calling them restrictions 
on the “conduct” of “harassment” or “stalking” rather than “speech”191 
(though only when dealing with restrictions on one-to-one speech). Such 
attempts to evade free speech protection by labeling are reminiscent of 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Cohen v. California, in which the entirety of 
the First Amendment discussion consisted of this paragraph: 
Cohen’s absurd and immature antic, in my view, was mainly conduct and little 
speech. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 536, 555 (1965); Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 
(1949). The California Court of Appeal appears so to have described it, 1 Cal. 
App. 3d 94, 100, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 507, and I cannot characterize it 
otherwise. Further, the case appears to me to be well within the sphere of 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), where Mr. Justice 
Murphy, a known champion of First Amendment freedoms, wrote for a 
unanimous bench. As a consequence, this Court’s agonizing over First 
Amendment values seems misplaced and unnecessary.192 
Justice Blackmun was, I think, mistaken in concluding that vulgarities 
should be substantively unprotected by the First Amendment (which is 
 
restrictions] are content neutral, they raise very different questions from the tort verdict at issue in this 
case.”); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992) (“Listeners’ reaction to 
speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.” (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 
46, 55–56 (1988))). 
188 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam); 403 U.S. 15 (1971); 372 U.S. 229 (1963); 337 U.S. 1 (1949); 
310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
189 See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308–09. 
190 Later cases have likewise treated Cohen, Edwards, Terminiello, and Cantwell as involving 
content-based restrictions. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 134–35; Police Dep’t 
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). 
191 See, e.g., Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1988); Gormley v. Dir., 632 F.2d 938, 
941–42 (2d Cir. 1980); McKillop v. State, 857 P.2d 358, 363 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993); State v. Musser, 
977 P.2d 131, 133 (Ariz. 1999); State v. Brown, 85 P.3d 109, 113 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); Baker v. State, 
494 P.2d 68, 70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); State v. Roesch, Nos. CR94-87735, CR94-87736 & CR94-
90639, 1995 WL 356776, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 6, 1995); State v. Elder, 382 So. 2d 687, 690 
(Fla. 1980); State v. Richards, 896 P.2d 357, 362 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); People v. Taravella, 350 
N.W.2d 780, 783 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Lee, 917 P.2d 159, 162 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996); State 
v. Alexander, 888 P.2d 175, 180 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Hemmingway, No. 2011AP2372-CR, 
2012 WL 5416222, ¶ 13 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2012). 
 192  Cohen, 403 U.S. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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what the Chaplinsky reference was suggesting). But he was even more 
clearly mistaken in dismissing Cohen’s wearing of the jacket as “mainly 
conduct and little speech.” The noncommunicative part of the conduct—
simply wearing a jacket, any jacket—was not why Cohen was being 
punished; Cohen was being punished precisely because of the speech 
written on his jacket. That’s a speech restriction, and labeling it “conduct” 
or “disturbing the peace” shouldn’t strip it of constitutional protection. 
The same is true as to “harassment.” The government may not 
“foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels,”193 such as 
“insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, 
obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for 
the repression of expression.”194 Likewise, it may not eliminate First 
Amendment scrutiny by just labeling communication as the “conduct” of 
“harassment.” 
2. “Secondary Effects”.—The Court has, controversially, concluded 
that some facially content-based laws should be treated as content neutral if 
they are justified with reference to the “secondary effects” of speech (such 
as the supposed tendency of adult bookstores and movie theaters to attract 
the crime prone).195 But the tendency of speech to distress people is not 
treated as a secondary effect, and neither is the tendency of speech to cause 
harms that flow from such distress—for instance, potential fights,196 
policing costs needed to prevent fights,197 and injury to international 
relations caused by protests outside foreign embassies.198 
Restrictions justified by such harms are thus seen as content based, not 
content neutral. “[T]he emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a 
‘secondary effect’ unrelated to the content of the expression itself.”199 
“Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for 
regulation.”200 
3. Hill v. Colorado.—In Hill v. Colorado, the Court upheld as 
content-neutral a restriction on “knowingly approach[ing]” within 8 feet of 
another person (and within 100 feet of a health care facility) without that 
person’s consent “for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, 
displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling 
 
193 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (referring to the label “solicitation”). 
194 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (footnotes omitted). 
195 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); id. at 447 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that these restrictions are indeed content based but 
nonetheless constitutional under narrow circumstances). 
196 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
197 See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992). 
198 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
199 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321) (internal quotation 
mark omitted); see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 394 (same). 
200 Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 134; see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 394. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
772 
with such other person.”201 This too was a controversial judgment, both 
among the Justices202 and among scholars.203 As the dissent pointed out, 
under the statute, a “speaker wishing to approach another for the purpose of 
communicating any message except one of protest, education, or 
counseling may do so without first securing the other’s consent,” and 
“[w]hether a speaker must obtain permission before approaching within 
eight feet—and whether he will be sent to prison for failing to do so—
depends entirely on what he intends to say when he gets there.”204 
Nonetheless, even under Hill the harassment laws that I describe 
remain content based. Hill’s judgment of content neutrality rested on the 
premise that “the State’s interests in protecting access and privacy, and 
providing the police with clear guidelines, are unrelated to the content of 
the demonstrators’ speech.”205 Coming within eight feet of someone 
without that person’s consent is an intrusion into the target’s personal space 
because of the speaker’s physical proximity, quite apart from whether the 
speaker’s message is offensive or simply unwanted. 
Harassment statutes that restrict speech about a person, on the other 
hand, apply to speech that is physically far removed from the subject of the 
speech. To the extent that they aim at protecting “privacy,” they aim at 
protecting against intrusions that stem precisely from the “content of the 
[defendant’s] speech”—the information revealed by the speech or the 
insulting or otherwise offensive nature of the speech—and not the physical 
intrusiveness of the speech. 
This distinction is also visible in the Court’s observation that the law 
in Hill was a “minor place restriction on an extremely broad category of 
communications with unwilling listeners.”206 To be sure, the narrowness of 
the restriction is generally not an aspect of the content discrimination 
analysis.207 Even a minor place restriction on speech with a certain content 
is generally seen as content based.208 Nonetheless, the physical narrowness 
and topical breadth of the restriction, coupled with the focus on the 
intrusion on unwilling listeners, reinforces the judgment that the law 
 
201 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000). 
202 Id. at 742–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
203 See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. LeBlanc, Disfavored Speech About Favored Rights: Hill 
v. Colorado, the Vanishing Public Forum and the Need for an Objective Speech Discrimination Test, 
51 AM. U. L. REV. 179, 182 (2001); see also Richard W. Garnett, Changing Minds: Proselytism, 
Freedom, and the First Amendment, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 453, 464 & n.65 (2005); Michael W. 
McConnell, Professor Michael W. McConnell’s Response, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 747, 747–49 (2001); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sex, Money, and Groups: Free Speech and Association Decisions in the October 
1999 Term, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 723, 736–37 (2001). 
204 Hill, 530 U.S. at 742 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
205 Id. at 719–20 (majority opinion). 
206 Id. at 723. 
207 Id. at 748 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
208 See supra Part II.E.1. 
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focuses on the physical intrusiveness of the speech: intrusiveness that is 
present only in a particular place, intrusiveness that is present without 
regard to the subject matter of the speech, and intrusiveness that stems from 
the fact that the speech is speech to an unwilling listener. 
Harassment laws that restrict speech about a person apply to a wide 
range of places and are thus hardly “minor place restriction[s].” They apply 
only to communications that are offensive because of their message, a 
much narrower category than all “protest, education, or counseling.” And 
they are not limited to speech directed to “unwilling listeners.” 
F. Bad Purpose 
1. Generally.—Most of the restrictions I describe apply only to 
speech that is said with a purpose to “annoy,” “embarrass,” “harass,” 
“torment,” or produce “substantial emotional distress.” These purposes, 
though, don’t strip the speech of constitutional protection. 
When speakers criticize a person for what they see as serious ethical 
failings—whether that person is a supposedly corrupt or oppressive 
politician, hypocritical religious leader, biased journalist, bigoted police 
officer, dishonest or rude professional or business owner, or unfaithful ex-
lover—they often believe that the target of the speech should feel bad 
because of the target’s misconduct. They may want the target to be socially 
ostracized, economically punished, and emotionally racked with guilt, 
regret, and a perception of social condemnation. 
Not all speakers take this view. Some might genuinely speak in 
sorrow, not in anger. Some might have an emotional or philosophical 
attitude that lets them wish that the subjects of their criticism reform 
without the subjects’ feeling bad in the process. And some might have a 
purely instrumental focus in which they (for instance) seek only that 
listeners vote against the subject of the speech and genuinely don’t care 
how the subject feels about it. 
Yet many speakers (maybe most) do feel, as a matter not just of malice 
but of justice, that the person whom they are condemning ought to feel 
annoyed, embarrassed, harassed, tormented, and substantially distressed by 
the groundswell of righteous hostility that the speakers are trying to 
foment. And that is true whether the hostility is from the public at large or 
from the speaker’s and subject’s mutual circle of acquaintances, once those 
acquaintances learn how badly the subject of the speech had supposedly 
mistreated the speaker. The purpose of making the subject feel bad is thus 
not an uncommon purpose, nor one held only by a few evil people. 
Nor is it a purpose that strips the speech of constitutional protection. 
As a general matter—as the Court recently said, quoting Martin Redish’s 
work—“under well-accepted First Amendment doctrine, a speaker’s 
motivation is entirely irrelevant to the question of constitutional 
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protection,”209 at least outside the narrow First Amendment exceptions such 
as incitement. This is so for four reasons. 
First, speech remains valuable to public debate even when the speaker 
is motivated by hostility. Often much of the most useful criticism of a 
person comes from people who have good reason to wish that person ill—if 
you are mistreated by a politician, religious leader, businessperson, or 
lawyer, you might acquire both useful information about the person’s faults 
and resentment towards that person. 
To be sure, the motivations of critics who are personally hostile to 
their subjects may make the criticism less credible, just like praise is made 
less credible when the speaker has good reason to wish the person well. But 
the criticisms may nonetheless be apt, despite the bias of the source. And if 
all those who wish a person ill were excluded from discussion of the 
person’s qualities, many accurate criticisms would never be aired. 
Second, speech remains an important part of a speaker’s self-
expression even when the speaker is motivated by hostility to the target of 
the speech. Those who feel themselves wronged by someone may have 
powerful emotional and moral reasons to complain about the alleged 
mistreatment and to warn others to be wary of the target. People whose ex-
spouses or ex-lovers have cheated on them, beat them, emotionally abused 
them, defrauded them, or infected them with sexually transmitted diseases 
are just as much engaged in self-expression when talking to their friends 
impartially—to the extent such a thing is possible—as when talking to their 
friends with the desire that the ex be banished from their social circle.210 
Third, precisely because people who intend to inform listeners about a 
person’s misdeeds often also intend to make the listener feel bad, even 
speakers who lack any hostile intent might be deterred by the fear that a 
prosecutor will think they were speaking out of hostility. Say you have long 
battled a politician, a religious figure, a journalist, an academic, a lawyer, 
or a businessperson, and each of you has hurt the other politically and 
economically. You now want to harshly criticize the person, not because of 
any desire to annoy, embarrass, or harass the person but simply because of 
a desire to inform the public of the person’s latest misbehavior. 
Yet you know that a prosecutor, judge, and jury might infer that you 
are motivated by a desire to annoy the other person, simply because such a 
desire is so common in situations like this (even if you know it’s absent in 
 
209 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 468 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J.) 
(alteration omitted) (citing MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE 
VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 91 (2001)). 
210 I assume here that the speech consists of true statements or of opinions, albeit ones that might 
have been motivated by hostility. If the speech consists of falsehoods, and especially knowing or 
reckless falsehoods, then it would be unprotected by the First Amendment regardless of the speaker’s 
motivation. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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your own mind).211 This is what FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 
referred to when it wrote that “an intent-based test”—there, a test focused 
on an intent to urge people to vote for or against a candidate— 
would chill core political speech by opening the door to a trial on every [item 
of speech], on the theory that the speaker actually intended to affect an 
election, no matter how compelling the indications that the ad concerned a 
pending legislative or policy issue. No reasonable speaker would choose to 
run an ad covered by [the statute] if its only defense to a criminal prosecution 
would be that its motives were pure. An intent-based standard “blankets with 
uncertainty whatever may be said,” and “offers no security for free 
discussion.” 
 . . . “First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.” An 
intent test provides none.212 
Fourth, people often assume the worst purposes in their adversaries 
and the best purposes in their allies. When someone harshly criticizes 
someone you approve of, it’s easy to infer not just that the critic is wrong 
but that he’s deliberately trying to annoy, harass, or distress. When 
someone harshly criticizes someone you disapprove of, it’s easy to infer 
that the critic must be animated purely by a desire to speak the truth and 
inform the public. People who have unpopular views might thus often be 
convicted of having an intent to annoy even when they lack such an 
intent—and might often be deterred from engaging in harsh but justified 
criticism for fear of being convicted. 
 
211 Consider, for instance, R.D. v. P.M., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 791, 800 n.11, 801 (Ct. App. 2011), 
which upheld an injunction that barred defendant from, among other things, distributing leaflets critical 
of plaintiff near plaintiff’s workplace. Defendant argued that she had distributed these leaflets “to 
inform consumers about her negative experience with [defendant] as a clinical social worker,” but 
“[t]he trial court concluded . . . that [plaintiff’s] intention was less to address an issue of public 
importance than to harass [defendant].” Perhaps the trial court correctly evaluated defendant’s 
predominant purpose. But even someone who has a legitimate grievance against a professional, 
businessperson, or government official—and who, as a result of this grievance, is obviously angry with 
the target—might reasonably worry that a court will find that his mixed intentions were mostly “to 
harass” rather than to criticize. 
 Likewise, consider Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 752 N.W.2d 359 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008), in which 
defendant set out to publicize plaintiff’s record of having been suspended for three years from the 
practice of law for defrauding a client. See In re Gilbert, 595 N.W.2d 715 (Wis. 1999) (per curiam). The 
court concluded that defendant was motivated only by hostility arising out of a past real estate 
transaction in which defendant had lost out to the plaintiff, and not by any “legitimate purpose” of 
informing people of plaintiff’s professional misconduct. Welytok, 752 N.W.2d at 370. Again, it’s 
possible that the court’s perception of defendant’s motivation was correct. But if speech about a person 
loses its constitutional protection when the court concludes that the speaker’s true motivation was 
revenge, then even speakers who are motivated by more than revenge might well be deterred from 
speaking by the worry that a court would misinterpret their intentions. 
212 551 U.S. at 468–69 (citation omitted); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) 
(“Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be proved 
in court that he spoke out of hatred . . . .”). 
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Note also that many of these laws define petty offenses for which the 
maximum sentence is six months or less, which means they can be tried 
without a jury.213 Other such laws call for injunctions and contempt 
proceedings for violating injunctions, for which a jury trial is likewise 
unavailable if the sentence is six months or less.214 A speaker might thus 
rightly worry that a misjudgment of motive on the part of just two people (a 
prosecutor and a judge)—or even just a judge acting alone—could lead to 
jail time for his speech. 
2. “Solely” Bad Purposes/“No Legitimate Purpose”.—Some 
statutes try to minimize the dangers of a purpose test by covering only 
behavior that is “solely” intended to annoy, embarrass, and the like.215 This, 
the theory goes, would focus only on an especially narrow range of speech 
that deserves no protection;216 and even if some instances of such speech 
should still be protected, at least they will be rare enough that the law 
would not be unconstitutionally overbroad. 
But nearly all speech to multiple listeners has multiple intentions, even 
when one of the intentions is to annoy the subject of the speech. Speakers 
who talk to others about someone they dislike will generally also want to 
persuade their listeners to condemn or shun that person. Among other 
things, such education of the listeners about the subject’s failings will help 
serve the goal of annoying the subject. 
Speakers who condemn someone to the public, or to their 
acquaintances, may also want to get the emotional reward that comes from 
expressing their true feelings. Speakers who cruelly mock someone might 
also want “to amuse and gain approval or notoriety” from some of their 
 
213 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1937). 
214 See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826–27 (1994). 
215 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(E) (2006) (outlawing “mak[ing] repeated telephone calls or 
repeatedly initiat[ing] communication with a telecommunications device, during which conversation or 
communication ensues, solely to harass any person at the called number or who receives the 
communication”); McKillop v. State, 857 P.2d 358, 364 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (interpreting the 
telephone harassment statute as “prohibit[ing] telephone calls only when the call has no legitimate 
communicative purpose—when the caller’s speech is devoid of any substantive information and the 
caller’s sole intention is to annoy or harass the recipient”); State v. Richards, 896 P.2d 357, 362 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1995) (interpreting the telephone harassment statute as “requiring that the sole intent of the 
call be to annoy, terrify, threaten, intimidate, harass or offend”). Major, supra note 182, at 136, suggests 
that the federal cyberstalking statute could likewise be saved from unconstitutionality by “be[ing] 
interpreted to apply only to speech with the sole intent of causing substantial emotional distress.” 
216 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Strahan, 570 N.E.2d 1041 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). 
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listeners.217 They may also want to shame the target into not repeating the 
target’s alleged misbehavior, whether towards the speakers or others.218 
So any law that is limited to speakers who have a “sole purpose” to 
annoy could be applied in one of three possible ways. First, it could be 
basically a dead letter, and known to be such, at least as to one-to-many 
speech, for the reasons I just mentioned. Indeed, one court has held that 
“[v]irtually all speech, other than threats or incitements to crime, has a 
constitutionally protected purpose” (and therefore a legitimate purpose), 
which is “conveying the speaker’s point of view. The fact that the listener 
is annoyed by what is said does not detract from the legitimate purpose of 
conveying the thoughts.”219 
Second, prosecutors, judges, and juries might ignore the “sole 
purpose” requirement and apply the law whenever they see annoying the 
target as the “main” or “predominant” purpose of the speech. But such a 
judgment of what constitutes the predominant purpose is so vague and 
subjective that it necessarily creates the three problems that the Court has 
identified as endemic to vague laws.220 It doesn’t provide speakers with 
guidance about what is and what isn’t a crime. It opens the door to 
viewpoint-discriminatory enforcement, as prosecutors, judges, and jurors 
fall into the normal human habit of applying vague rules more favorably 
towards those they like than towards those they dislike. And it tends to 
cause people to “steer far wider of the unlawful zone,”221 for fear that they 
would be wrongly found to have spoken with an improper predominant 
purpose. 
 
217 See, e.g., A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223, 1225, 1227 (Ind. 2008) (reversing harassment 
conviction under a statute that required a showing of “no intent of legitimate communication,” because 
the speaker might have “merely intended to amuse and gain approval or notoriety from her friends, 
and/or to generally vent anger for her personal grievances”). 
218 Some nonspeech conduct might come closer to having a sole purpose to annoy—calling 
someone in the middle of the night and then hanging up might qualify since it doesn’t inform any third 
parties of anything, doesn’t provide the catharsis of telling someone how you really feel about her 
alleged mistreatment of you, and doesn’t even communicate to the listener the message that she should 
feel ashamed or remorseful. Even there, the caller would have the purpose of enjoying herself, or 
perhaps even laughing with her friends about it, but one might see those purposes as stemming from the 
annoyance of the listener. But speech, especially speech to people other than just the person being 
criticized, generally has many more purposes. 
219 People v. Hogan, 664 N.Y.S.2d 204, 207 n.1 (Crim. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 698 N.Y.S.2d 388 (App. 
Div. 1998); see also id. at 207 (“The registering of displeasure with another person is legitimate, 
protected speech.”); Strahan, 570 N.E.2d at 1043 (concluding that defendant couldn’t be convicted of 
harassment under a statute that required a “sole purpose” to harass because, even if part of his purpose 
was to harass, “nothing in the evidence furnished a reasonable basis for concluding that the defendant 
was not motivated at least in part by a desire to reestablish a relationship with the woman”); People v. 
Bethea, No. 2003BX036814, 2004 WL 190054 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Jan. 13, 2004) (discussed infra note 
225). 
220 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–14 (1972). 
221 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 
(1958)). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
778 
Third, judges interpreting the law may conclude that, as a matter of 
law, “sole purpose to annoy” covers not just the purpose to annoy but also 
the purpose to ostracize, the purpose to get emotional reward from berating 
someone, the purpose to shame, and so on. But this would broaden the 
law—and make it vaguer—to the point that any supposed narrowing 
benefit of the “sole purpose” requirement would be lost. 
Much the same is true of statutory provisions that seek to narrow a 
statute’s coverage by limiting it to behavior that lacks a “legitimate 
purpose.”222 What constitutes a legitimate purpose, especially when it 
comes to speech, is a matter of obvious dispute—dispute that often relates 
to the viewpoint of the speech involved.223 
Is it a legitimate purpose to start a public campaign to persuade people 
to stop doing business with a lawyer or a business owner who allegedly 
behaved rudely? Who belongs to an allegedly racially prejudiced 
organization? Who belongs to a religious group that one thinks has a 
heretical or satanic theology? 
Likewise, is it a legitimate purpose to try to get your friends and 
acquaintances to shun someone who has cheated on you? Has been 
promiscuous but not unfaithful? Has engaged in unsafe sex? Has engaged 
in homosexual sex? Has had an abortion? Has aborted what would have 
been your child and might do the same with other lovers in the future?224 Is 
“a poor father to [your and his] child”?225 Secretly belongs to a religious 
group that holds racially prejudiced beliefs? 
Does “no purpose of legitimate communication” only cover speech 
that consists of “threats and/or intimidating or coercive utterances,” as New 
 
222 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-92(c) (LexisNexis 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1809(R) 
(2003 & Supp. 2012). 
223 Lafaro v. Cahill, 56 P.3d 56 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002), upheld one such statute by reasoning that the 
“serves no legitimate purpose” proviso “exclude[s] pure political speech” from the scope of the statute. 
Id. at 62. But this does little to cure the problem because the First Amendment protects much more 
speech than just “pure political speech.” See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 
(2010); see also Boychuk, supra note 174, at 790 (“A standard as vague as ‘serves no legitimate 
purpose’ gives law enforcement officers a great deal of discretion in deciding whether certain behavior 
falls within the statute’s scope.”). 
224 See Eugene Volokh, When Facts About Another’s Life Are Also Facts About Your Life, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 7, 2011, 7:58 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/06/07/when-facts-about-
anothers-life-are-also-facts-about-your-life. 
225 See People v. Bethea, No. 2003BX036814, 2004 WL 190054, at *1–2 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Jan. 13, 
2004) (concluding that this is indeed a legitimate purpose “because Americans are, after all, free to 
criticize one another”). Defendant included Kareem Williams’s picture, date of birth, social security 
number, address, and phone number, and the text: 
 Wanted for child support, Kareem Williams . . . Last seen fucking some whore bitch he pick 
up. Like all deadbeat he thinks he some kind of pimp daddy. He lives off people. And when he 
gets a dollar, he acts like he is God. That’s how you can tell he a asshole, not use to shit. Any 
information please call Child Support Hotline 212-226-7125. 
Id. (alteration in original). The court’s conclusion that the speech had a legitimate purpose may be 
correct, but, if it is, then virtually any speech has a legitimate purpose. 
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York’s highest court held?226 Or does mailing a torn-up copy of a support 
order to one’s ex-wife—which seems likely to have been motivated by a 
desire to express one’s feelings about the order, and perhaps also one’s 
plans not to abide by it—also qualify as conduct that “serve[s] no 
legitimate purpose,” as New Jersey’s highest court held?227 
None of these are settled questions, nor are they likely to become so 
any time soon.228 One’s judgment about the legitimacy of the purposes 
often depends on one’s judgment about the view that the speech expresses. 
Those who believe that homosexuality is immoral may well see a 
“legitimate purpose” in trying to get people to shun a classmate because of 
his homosexuality; those on the other side of the issue may well disagree. 
Conversely, those who agree that bias against homosexuals is immoral may 
well see a “legitimate purpose” in trying to get people to shun a classmate 
because of his hostility to homosexuality; those on the other side of that 
question may disagree. The Colorado Supreme Court was right to conclude 
that: 
Adding a phrase “without any legitimate purpose” to that subsection injects a 
vagueness into the statute which cannot withstand First Amendment scrutiny. 
Such a “limiting construction” disguises the constitutional difficulties of the 
statute but does nothing to resolve them. . . . This delegation of power to 
judges or juries with no ascertainable standards does not give sufficient 
breathing room to the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and 
press.229 
Judgments about the legitimacy of a speaker’s purpose are 
troublesome enough in tort lawsuits, such as lawsuits for interference with 
business relations through ill-motivated true statements and statements of 
opinion. This is one reason why this tort has sometimes been held to be 
 
226 People v. Stuart, 797 N.E.2d 28, 41 (N.Y. 2003); People v. Shack, 658 N.E.2d 706, 712 (N.Y. 
1995). 
227 State v. Hoffman, 695 A.2d 236, 243 (N.J. 1997). 
228 The few explicit state court attempts to define “no legitimate purpose” that I’ve seen hardly 
help. See Towell v. Steger, 154 S.W.3d 471, 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (“To find a ‘course of conduct’ to 
have no legitimate purpose, we must find that the actions were not sanctioned by law or custom, were 
not lawful, or allowed.”); State v. Porelle, 822 A.2d 562, 566 (N.H. 2003) (“A legitimate purpose is one 
that is genuine or ‘accordant with law.’”); Commonwealth v. Wheaton, 598 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1991) (“While the term ‘legitimate purpose’ has not been clearly defined, the comments to 
the Model Penal Code state that ‘[t]he import of the phrase, however, is broadly to exclude from this 
subsection any conduct that directly furthers some legitimate desire or objective of the actor. This 
element of the residual offense should limit its application to unarguably reprehensible instances of 
intentional imposition on another.’” (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 cmt. 5, at 368 (1980))); 
Commonwealth v. Bare, 1 Pa. D. & C.4th 480, 483 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1988) (defining “intent of ‘legitimate 
communication’” as intent to engage in “communication that is justified in the sense that its purpose 
conforms to recognized and accepted standards of good conduct and decency and in that sense is 
otherwise lawful”). 
229 Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80, 83 (Colo. 1975). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
780 
constitutionally precluded230 and has generally been read quite narrowly.231 
But I think the constitutional vagueness problem—stemming from the lack 
of guidance to speakers, the risk of viewpoint discrimination in 
enforcement, and the risk of deterring even speech that is well-motivated—
becomes insuperable when it comes to criminal punishment for speech that 
allegedly lacks “legitimate purpose.”232 
3. Criminal Libel Laws and the “Good Motives” Limitation on the 
Truth Defense.—As I noted in the Introduction, there is a 
precedent for the punishment of ill-motivated speech about someone. Pre-
1960s criminal libel law in many states provided that truth was a defense 
only if the statements were made with “good motives” and for “justifiable 
ends.”233 A minority of states took the same view as to civil libel actions, 
though most states treated truth as a complete defense, perhaps because 
true allegations only took away from the plaintiff that part of his reputation 
that he had not properly earned.234 
Starting in 1964, though, this sort of liability largely died out. In 
Garrison v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court expressly held that truth had to 
 
230 See, e.g., Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 1990). 
231 See, e.g., Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 954 & n.11 (Cal. 2003) 
(rejecting the theory that an interference with business relations tort could be based on lawful conduct 
so long as it is done for an improper motive); Walnut St. Assocs., Inc. v. Brokerage Concepts, Inc., 20 
A.3d 468 (Pa. 2011); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772(a) (1979) (providing that true 
statements cannot lead to liability for interference with business relations). 
232 See State v. Norris-Romine, 894 P.2d 1221, 1224–25 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (striking down a state 
stalking statute on those grounds). But see State v. Fratzke, 446 N.W.2d 781, 782, 783 (Iowa 1989) 
(concluding that the presence of a “without legitimate purpose” proviso in a statute reading, “A person 
commits harassment when, with intent to intimidate, annoy or alarm another person, the person . . . 
[c]ommunicates with another by telephone, telegraph, or writing without legitimate purpose and in a 
manner likely to cause the other person annoyance or harm,” “eliminates any constitutional impediment 
to application of the ‘intent to annoy’ element” (alteration in original)). Some courts have upheld 
statutes that ban conduct that poses a “credible threat with the intent to place such person in reasonable 
fear for such person’s safety” and at the same time lacks a “legitimate purpose.” State v. Rucker, 987 
P.2d 1080, 1090, 1094–95 (Kan. 1999); see Donley v. City of Mountain Brook, 429 So. 2d 603, 611 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1982), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ex parte Donley, 429 So. 2d 618 (Ala. 1983); 
People v. Tran, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 652 (Ct. App. 1996); Johnson v. State, 449 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. 
1994); see also Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 237–38 (Fla. 1995) (same as to a statute that required a 
“credible threat” and excluded “constitutionally protected activity”); Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d 1358, 
1359–60, 1363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533 & 
n.1, 536 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (same as to statute that required conduct that purposefully or knowingly 
places the target “in reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury,” where the “no 
legitimate purpose” proviso was added by the court as a limiting construction rather than appearing in 
the statute). A threat requirement, however, materially narrows the scope of the statute—indeed, likely 
limits it to constitutionally unprotected true threats—and thus the potential deterrent effect of the vague 
“legitimate purpose” constraint. This Article discusses laws that restrict speech that does not fall within 
the First Amendment exception for threats. 
233 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
234 Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense in 
Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 807–08 (1964). 
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be an absolute defense when a libel lawsuit or prosecution is brought based 
on “criticism . . . of public officials and their conduct of public business,” 
without regard to the speaker’s motives.235 In the 1974 Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc. case, the Court rested the constitutionality of libel law 
generally—even when private figures were involved—on the assertion that 
“there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”236 And though 
the 1985 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. decision held 
that states had broad latitude in defining libel law for statements on matters 
of purely private concern, the three Justices in the lead opinion plus Justice 
White repeatedly stressed that they were speaking of “false . . . 
statements.”237 Not since the 1952 Beauharnais v. Illinois group libel case 
has the Court upheld a truth defense limited to speech said with good 
motives;238 and Beauharnais is widely believed to no longer be good law,239 
 
235 379 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1964). 
236 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
237 472 U.S. 749, 751 (1985) (three-Justice lead opinion) (“The question presented in this case is 
whether this rule of Gertz applies when the false and defamatory statements do not involve matters of 
public concern.”); id. at 762 (concluding that the speaker’s and listeners’ interest in purely economic 
questions “warrants no special protection when—as in this case—the speech is wholly false and clearly 
damaging to the victim’s business reputation”); id. at 763 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment) 
(characterizing pre-Sullivan libel law as covering only falsehoods); id. at 767–68 (White, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (relying on the Gertz “no constitutional value in false statements of fact” quote and 
generally supporting broad libel liability for defamatory falsehoods). The dissenters would have 
followed Gertz even as to statements on matters of purely private concern. Id. at 775–76 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
238 343 U.S. 250, 265–66 (1952). 
239 See, e.g., Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 
2008); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 1989); Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 
Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir. 
1978); Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 n.14 (8th Cir. 1973); Anti-Defamation League of 
B’Nai B’rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., concurring); City of 
Cincinnati v. Black, 220 N.E.2d 821, 827–28 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1043–45 (4th ed. 2011); TRIBE, supra note 175, 
§ 12-17, at 926; Steven G. Gey, What if Wisconsin v. Mitchell Had Involved Martin Luther King, Jr.? 
The Constitutional Flaws of Hate Crime Enhancement Statutes, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1014, 1055 
(1997); Arnold H. Loewy, Free Speech for Holocaust Deniers—It Is the American Way, 47 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 721, 723 (2008–2009); Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: 
The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 219 (1991); Robert C. Post, Cultural 
Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 
330–31 (1988); Rodney A. Smolla, Words “Which by Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury”: The 
Evolving Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 
317, 351–52 (2009); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 518; Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, 
and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1116 n.29 (2006). Alexander Tsesis 
argues, in Burning Crosses on Campus: University Hate Speech Codes, 43 CONN. L. REV. 617, 637 
(2010), that Beauharnais remains good precedent, but I feel comfortable saying that he is very much in 
the minority among those who have considered the matter. 
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partly because it rested on a theory that libel law was immune from First 
Amendment scrutiny240—a view rejected in New York Times v. Sullivan.241 
Indeed, many lower courts have held that truth must be an absolute 
defense (notwithstanding the speaker’s motives) when speech is on a 
matter of public concern.242 Several have more broadly said that truth must 
be a defense generally, with no limitation to public-concern speech, just as 
Gertz defined libel law as justified on the grounds that it only punishes 
falsehoods, without limiting this principle to public-concern speech.243 And 
two courts have expressly held that truth must be an absolute defense, even 
as to statements on matters of purely private concern.244 
I have found only a smattering of lower court cases since Gertz that 
mention the “good motives” limitation on the defense of truth,245 and none 
deals with the general First Amendment issue in any detail. All but two just 
follow older state law cases on the subject without discussing the First 
Amendment. One of the remaining two, the Illinois case Welch v. Chicago 
Tribune Co., simply distinguishes an earlier First Amendment precedent on 
the grounds that “[t]he case at bar does not concern public figures or 
issues.”246 And the other case, also from Illinois—People v. Heinrich—
involves a statute that, though framed as a criminal libel law, is limited 
only to defamatory statements that are also fighting words; the court’s 
defense of the statute repeatedly stresses this feature.247 
For the reasons given in Part II.G below, I think the general conclusion 
that libel law is limited to false statements of fact makes good First 
Amendment sense and is also dictated by Garrison, Gertz, and Dun & 
 
240 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 254–58. 
241 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
242 See, e.g., Tollett, 485 F.2d at 1098; Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289, 296 (Alaska 1978); 
People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935, 940 (Colo. 1991); Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 253 N.E.2d 408, 410 (Ill. 
1969); Shaari v. Harvard Student Agencies, Inc., 691 N.E.2d 925, 929 (Mass. 1998); State v. Powell, 
839 P.2d 139, 143 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); Parmelee v. O’Neel, 186 P.3d 1094, 1101 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2008), rev’d on other grounds, 229 P.3d 723 (Wash. 2010). 
243 See, e.g., Weston v. State, 528 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Ark. 1975); State v. Helfrich, 922 P.2d 1159, 
1161 (Mont. 1996); Commonwealth v. Armao, 286 A.2d 626, 632 (Pa. 1972). 
244 Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1006 (10th Cir. 2010); Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co., 771 P.2d 406, 
429 (Cal. 1989). 
245 Several apply Florida and Illinois law, and one each applies Massachusetts and Rhode Island 
law. Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 28 & n.7 (1st Cir.) (so stating this as a matter of state law), 
reaff’d, 561 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2009); Litman v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1549, 1561 (11th Cir. 
1984), aff’d, 791 F.2d 855 (11th Cir. 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 825 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1987); 
Hoth v. Am. States Ins. Co., 753 F. Supp. 703, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1990); LRX, Inc. v. Horizon Assocs. Joint 
Venture, 842 So. 2d 881, 886 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), aff’d, 922 So. 2d 984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005); Lipsig v. Ramlawi, 760 So. 2d 170, 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Drennen v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 328 So. 2d 52, 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); People v. Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d 966, 970 (Ill. 
1984); Welch v. Chi. Tribune Co., 340 N.E.2d 539, 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); Johnson v. Johnson, 654 
A.2d 1212, 1216 (R.I. 1995). 
246 340 N.E.2d at 544. 
247 470 N.E.2d at 970–71. 
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Bradstreet. The rare cases that continue to apply the “good motives” 
limitation for speech on matters of “private concern” are mistaken. And the 
pre-1960s tradition of allowing criminal libel punishment for true 
statements, depending on the judge’s and jury’s evaluation of the speaker’s 
motivation, should offer no support for modern criminal harassment laws. 
G. Speech on Matters of Purely Private Concern 
The four main examples that I gave in the Introduction all involved 
speech related to politics, religion, or government conduct. What if a 
harassment statute were limited to speech about people that is on matters of 
“purely private concern”? No harassment statutes currently embody such a 
limitation, but what if one did?248 
The Court has indeed held that false statements of fact are less 
protected against civil defamation liability when they deal with matters of 
“purely private concern,” and that the government acting as employer has 
broad power to fire and discipline employees when they speak on matters 
of “purely private concern.”249 And in Snyder v. Phelps, the Court 
suggested that statements on matters of purely private concern could lead to 
liability under the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort, which 
allows such liability for statements that are “outrageous” and that 
recklessly or purposefully inflict “severe emotional distress.”250 
But the Court has long resisted the notion that such speech can be 
criminally punished. We saw this in United States v. Stevens, which struck 
down a ban on certain depictions of violence towards animals.251 The 
 
248 See State v. Brown, 85 P.3d 109, 111, 114 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting First Amendment 
challenge to ban on “conduct directed at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to be 
seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed and [which] in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the 
person” because “Brown’s repeated entreaties to [his ex-girlfriend] that they resume their relationship 
do not contain any such particularized political or social message warranting First Amendment 
protection”); R.D. v. P.M., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 791, 800 (Ct. App. 2011) (upholding injunction that barred 
defendant from, among other things, distributing leaflets critical of plaintiff near plaintiff’s workplace, 
partly because the speech had “only slight apparent relationship to any issue of public interest”); 
Rzeszutek v. Beck, 649 N.E.2d 673, 680–81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting challenge to protective 
order entered on behalf of a young woman against her family, partly because “person to person 
conversations between Lucy and her family members are largely unrelated to the market in ideas, and 
they are not protected by the first amendment”); Johnson v. Arlotta, No. A11-630, 2011 WL 6141651, 
at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2011) (upholding injunction against speech that “affects or intends to 
adversely affect the . . . privacy of” the plaintiff, partly because the speech “did not implicate matters of 
public concern”). Note that the law in Brown may well be a permissible restriction on unwanted one-to-
one speech, see supra Part I, whether or not the speech includes a “particularized political or social 
message.” 
249 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759, 763 (1985); Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983). 
250 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215–16 (2011).  
251 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). Much of the discussion in this section borrows from Eugene Volokh, 
The Trouble with “Public Discourse” as a Limitation on Free Speech Rights, 97 VA. L. REV. 567 
(2011). 
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statute had a specific exception for “any depiction that has serious 
religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic 
value,”252 and the government stressed that exception in defending the 
statute. But the Court concluded that the exception did not save the statute. 
“Most of what we say to one another lacks ‘religious, political, 
scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value’ (let alone 
serious value),” the Court held, “but it is still sheltered from government 
regulation.”253 “Even ‘[w]holly neutral futilities . . . come under the 
protection of free speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or Donne’s 
sermons.’”254 The Court was thus not willing to limit constitutional 
protection to that speech which relates to matters of public concern. And 
the examples to which the Court pointed in reasoning that the statute was 
overbroad255 were indeed not much connected to political, religious, 
scientific, or artistic matters—they included videos and photographs of 
hunting, depictions of certain livestock management and slaughter 
practices, and videos of cockfighting taken in places (such as Puerto Rico) 
where cockfighting is legal.256 
Likewise, consider Sable Communications v. FCC, which struck down 
a ban on dial-a-porn.257 Dial-a-porn, even nonobscene dial-a-porn, seems 
pretty far removed from matters of public concern. City of San Diego v. 
Roe,258 cited by Snyder v. Phelps,259 expressly viewed pornography as not 
being speech on matters of public concern, and thus concluded that the 
government could fire an employee for producing pornography. Yet the 
Sable Court unanimously applied the same strict scrutiny test to a criminal 
law restricting dial-a-porn as it has applied to criminal laws restricting 
speech on matters of public concern.260 Other pornography cases, such as 
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. and Ashcroft v. ACLU 
(II), have done the same.261 
Consider also Connick v. Myers. In the course of adopting a public 
concern limit to protection against the government as employer, the Court 
wrote: 
“[T]he First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the 
extent it can be characterized as political. . . .” We in no sense suggest that 
 
252 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1590. 
253 Id. at 1591.  
254 Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971)). 
255 Id. at 1587–88 (“[T]he constitutionality of [the statute] hinges on how broadly it is 
construed. . . . We read [the statute] to create a criminal prohibition of alarming breadth.”). 
256 Id. at 1588–89. 
257 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
258 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam).  
259 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011). 
260 492 U.S. at 126.  
261 Ashcroft, 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004); Playboy, 529 U.S. 803, 826–27 (2000). 
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speech on private matters falls into one of the narrow and well-defined classes 
of expression which carries so little social value, such as obscenity, that the 
State can prohibit and punish such expression by all persons in its 
jurisdiction. . . . We hold only that when a public employee speaks . . . as an 
employee upon matters only of personal interest . . . a federal court is not the 
appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision 
taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.262 
So the areas in which First Amendment law offers lower protection for 
speech on matters of private concern—government employee speech 
(Connick v. Myers), false accusations that injure a person’s reputation (Dun 
& Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders), and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (Snyder v. Phelps)—are the exceptions rather than the 
rule. And they are exceptions that seem limited to civil lawsuits or other 
noncriminal punishment (such as loss of a job). 
Moreover, limiting the private concern doctrine to civil cases is 
especially apt given the vagueness of the public concern/private concern 
line, which the Court has never defined clearly, and which has often been 
applied in surprising ways that seem quite inapt as to criminal liability for 
true statements. For instance, Connick v. Myers held that an assistant 
prosecutor’s criticism of her managers was generally speech that was not 
on a matter of public concern. Yet—as Connick itself suggests—surely 
such criticism of prosecutors couldn’t be made a crime, even when the 
speaker “intends to annoy” the prosecutors. Likewise, Dun & Bradstreet 
held that an erroneous and narrowly communicated credit report statement 
that a small business had declared bankruptcy wasn’t on a matter of public 
concern and could thus more easily lead to libel liability. Yet true 
statements that a business had declared bankruptcy can’t be criminally 
punished (or for that matter can’t even lead to civil liability).263 
Similarly, lower court libel and government employee speech opinions 
apply the public concern test in inconsistent ways. Nat Stern’s Private 
Concerns of Private Plaintiffs: Revisiting a Problematic Defamation 
Category offers a superb summary of just how inconsistent the decisions 
are;264 here, I just offer a few examples. 
Consider, for instance, accusations of crime. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court recently held that a person’s online allegation that his uncle had 
molested him when the person was a child was a matter of purely “private 
concern” for libel law purposes.265 On the other hand, the California Court 
 
262 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
(quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967)). 
263 Cf. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (rejecting liability for disclosure of personal 
information taken from government records); Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 560 
(Cal. 2004) (same). 
264 65 MO. L. REV. 597 (2000). 
265 W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1157 (N.J. 2012). 
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of Appeal concluded that the inclusion of a claim, in a leaflet posted around 
town listing alleged sexual attackers, that a particular man had attempted to 
rape a woman was a matter of “public concern.”266 
The California opinion noted that the specific allegation was included 
as part of a newsletter that discussed sexual assault, but I doubt that this 
would yield much of a distinction. The allegation in the New Jersey case 
was part of a discussion in which the nephew complained about what he 
saw as the miscarriage of justice in an earlier libel case arising from the 
same allegation, including “allegations of perjury and intimidation of a 
witness.”267 The bottom line is that lower courts haven’t reached any clear 
answer as to when an allegation of a crime is a matter of public concern. A 
statute that defined punishable speech in terms of public concern would 
thus not give speakers, prosecutors, judges, or juries enough guidance 
about what speech is punishable. 
And, more importantly, regardless of how such allegations should be 
treated for libel purposes when they are false, surely such allegations 
cannot lead to liability—including criminal punishment—when they are 
true. People ought to be free to discuss serious crimes that others have 
committed, even though naturally such discussions would annoy and 
distress the criminals (who would rather remain unknown) and may even 
be partly intended to distress the criminals.268 
Likewise, consider three cases dealing with allegations of substance 
abuse. Ayala v. Washington held that a letter to an airline alleging that one 
of its pilots—the defendant’s ex-boyfriend—was a marijuana user was 
merely on a subject of “private concern.”269 Starrett v. Wadley, on the other 
 
266 Carney v. Santa Cruz Women Against Rape, 271 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32, 37 (Ct. App. 1990); see also 
Forrester v. WVTM TV, Inc., 709 So. 2d 23, 26 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (concluding that depiction of a 
man slapping his child at the child’s baseball game, included in a broadcast about excessive pressure on 
children in youth sports, “brought up a matter of public concern, i.e., whether adults put too much 
pressure on children in sports”). 
267 W.J.A., 43 A.3d at 1151. 
268 For an example of a harassment prosecution for speech alleging that someone committed child 
molestation—with no requirement of a proof of falsity—see State v. Ellison, 900 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2008). Ellison and Gerhard were girls who had been friends, but their friendship stopped in 
seventh grade when Ellison’s younger brother alleged that Gerhard had molested him. (The police 
“investigated . . . and determined that [they] did not have enough evidence to substantiate” the claim. 
Id. at 229.) In high school, Ellison posted a message to her MySpace page, alleging that Gerhard had 
“[m]olested a little boy.” Id. 
 For this, Ellison was prosecuted and convicted of “mak[ing] . . . a telecommunication . . . with 
purpose to abuse, threaten, or harass another person,” id. at 230; no showing of falsehood was required 
under the statute. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute didn’t apply, apparently 
partly because it read the term “harass” as implicitly requiring that the conduct “serve[] no legitimate 
purpose.” Id. The court concluded that the prosecution didn’t sufficiently disprove the theory that 
Ellison was motivated by “the legitimate purpose of warning others of what Ellison believed to be 
criminal behavior.” Id. at 231. 
269 679 A.2d 1057, 1068 (D.C. 1996). 
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hand, held that an allegation that a supervisor at a tax assessor’s office had 
an alcohol problem was a matter of “public concern,” because it revealed 
improper behavior by a government official.270 And Veilleux v. NBC 
expressly rejected liability for true reports of drug use by a truck driver 
under the disclosure of private facts tort, concluding that the named 
driver’s “drug test results were of legitimate public concern.”271 
As a result, it’s hard to tell, in the wake of these cases, how allegations 
of drug or alcohol abuse would be treated under a public concern test. And 
in any event, whatever the right answer might be as to false allegations, or 
allegations that lead only to government employment action, surely true 
allegations of substance abuse should be fully constitutionally protected, as 
Veilleux indeed held. 
Finally, consider two examples of statements related to political or 
social matters. One is the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Osborne.272 Solomon 
Osborne was a black trial court judge who was running for reelection; at 
one campaign speech before a predominantly black political organization 
Osborne said, “White folks don’t praise you unless you’re a damn fool. 
Unless they think they can use you. If you have your own mind and know 
what you’re doing, they don’t want you around.”273 The Mississippi 
Supreme Court suspended Osborne for a year on the grounds that “conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . brought the judicial office 
into disrepute,”274 and it rejected Osborne’s First Amendment defense by 
concluding that the speech was unprotected under the “legitimate public 
concern” test applicable to speech by government employees. Osborne’s 
statement, the court held, “is not worthy of being deemed a matter of 
legitimate political concern in his reelection campaign, but merely an 
expression of his personal animosity.”275 
It’s not clear to me that speech by elected officials, such as judges, 
should be subject to the same First Amendment standards as speech by 
ordinary government employees. I also doubt that the speech here was 
rightly described as not “of legitimate political concern,” since Osborne’s 
statement—however prejudiced—was directly related to political power 
and race relations. 
But in any case, it’s hard to reconcile this decision with the same 
court’s decision just five years earlier, in Mississippi Commission on 
Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson,276 which held that sharply 
 
270 876 F.2d 808, 817 (10th Cir. 1989). 
271 206 F.3d 92, 134 (1st Cir. 2000). 
272 11 So. 3d 107 (Miss. 2009). 
273 Id. at 109. 
274 Id. at 118. 
275 Id. at 113. 
276 876 So. 2d 1006 (Miss. 2004). 
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antihomosexual statements by a sitting judge (made in a letter to the editor 
and then in a radio interview) were on a matter of public concern.277 Again, 
a public concern standard in a criminal harassment law would leave 
speakers, prosecutors, judges, and juries uncertain about what speech is 
protected.278 
And more importantly, whatever the right answer when it comes to the 
firing of government employees or the discipline of government-employed 
judges, surely the public concern standard as applied in these cases is an 
unconstitutional basis for criminal punishment for the expression of 
opinion. Even if Solomon Osborne was rightly disciplined for his 
statements about whites—on the grounds that judges are ultimately 
government employees and the government as employer has to have 
special power to control its employees’ speech—he shouldn’t be criminally 
punishable for such statements, even if he made the statements with the 
purpose of annoying, embarrassing, or distressing some people. 
A public concern/private concern line may be acceptable in the limited 
circumstances in which it has operated for the last few decades: the 
government acting as employer and the imposition of liability for false 
statements (though even there it has been controversial279). And perhaps 
such a line is acceptable when it comes to civil liability—an area where 
vagueness concerns have been seen as less significant, though by no means 
insignificant—in the narrow zone of cases that involve “outrageous” 
conduct that recklessly causes severe emotional distress.280 But given the 
vagueness and breadth of what courts have been willing to label “private 
concern,” that line shouldn’t be transplanted to criminal punishments for 
true statements. 
H. Harm 
Even “harassing” speech, then, is presumptively constitutionally 
protected, so long as it doesn’t fit within one of the First Amendment 
exceptions. But should the presumption be rebutted, either under the rubric 
of strict scrutiny or through recognizing some new exception? 
The answer, I think, is generally “no.” This is particularly so as to 
speech on political, religious, or social matters—even when the speech is 
 
277 Id. at 1011–13. 
278 Likewise, compare Vern Sims Ford, Inc. v. Hagel, 713 P.2d 736, 741 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), 
holding that disgruntled customer’s mailings alleging dishonesty by a car dealership did “not involve a 
matter of public concern,” with Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2009), holding that 
consumer advocacy show’s statements alleging poor customer service by a boat dealer were on a matter 
of public concern, and Paradise Hills Assocs. v. Procel, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514, 523 (Ct. App. 1991), 
holding that disgruntled customers had a First Amendment right to picket home building company. 
279 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 774–76 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting, writing for four Justices); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 156–57 & n.1 
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting, writing for four Justices). 
280 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011). 
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deliberately offensive and annoying to its target. Snyder v. Phelps and 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell held that such speech can’t lead to civil 
liability even when it is “outrageous” and purposefully causes severe 
emotional distress281 (historically a highly demanding standard282). It thus 
can’t lead to criminal liability under the considerably lower standards 
imposed by criminal harassment laws.283 
Nor does it matter whether the speaker’s speech is repeated many 
times. The law may indeed restrict speaking to a person repeatedly, after 
it’s clear that the recipient of the speech doesn’t want to hear the speech.284 
But speech about a person remains constitutionally valuable whether it is 
said once or often. Trying to effectively reach an audience often requires 
multiple attempts, as well as follow-up arguments aimed at supporting and 
explaining one’s initial criticisms. 
As Part II.G noted, Snyder did suggest that speech that is outrageous 
and recklessly or purposefully causes severe emotional distress could lead 
to civil liability when it is on a matter of purely private concern. But, as 
that Part argued, the public/private concern distinction is too ill-defined to 
adequately protect free speech, both in the sense that the distinction is 
vague and in the sense that past attempts to define the distinction have 
yielded results that are unsuited to restraints on accurate speech imposed by 
the government as sovereign. 
Perhaps District Attorney Harry Connick should be able to fire Sheila 
Myers for her criticisms of the D.A.’s office, on the grounds that such 
employment grievances are not on a matter of “private concern.” But surely 
he should not be able to prosecute her for “criminal harassment” if she 
blogs her criticisms in a way that is supposedly intended to annoy or 
embarrass her higher-ups. 
More broadly, as Part II.B noted, the existing First Amendment 
exceptions already recognize certain kinds of injuries to individual people 
that can be inflicted by speech. If false statements defame people, they may 
be unprotected libel.285 If impersonating someone and claiming that she is 
seeking casual sex leads people to contact the victim of impersonation in 
 
281 Id.; 485 U.S. 46, 50–52 (1988). 
282 See Hughes v. Pair, 209 P.3d 963, 976 (Cal. 2009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 
cmt. d (1965). 
283 See also United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 584–85 (D. Md. 2011) (rejecting the 
claim that a ban on one-to-many speech that causes substantial emotional distress is justified by a 
“compelling interest in protecting victims from emotional distress sustained through an interactive 
computer service”). 
284 See supra Part I. 
285 See, e.g., Evans v. Evans, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859, 868 (Ct. App. 2008) (stating that a court could 
enjoin an ex-wife’s false and defamatory communications about her ex-husband if those “specific 
statements [have been] found at trial to be defamatory” (emphasis omitted)).  
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distressing and frightening ways, such false speech may likewise be 
unprotected.286 
If statements threaten someone, they may fit within the “true threats” 
exception. If they offend someone and are sent directly to that person, they 
might be restrictable one-to-one speech, as discussed in Part I. Perhaps if 
they reveal certain narrowly and clearly defined categories of highly 
dangerous or embarrassing information about others, such as their social 
security numbers or pictures of them naked or having sex, they could be 
covered by some possible exception for speech that unjustifiably invades 
privacy. (The scope of this privacy exception may also be somewhat 
broader than this, but the matter is far from settled.)287 
But outside those exceptions, speech about a person—however 
offensive—consists simply of people expressing opinions and 
communicating facts about each other. “As a general matter, Americans are 
free to say and to write bad things about each other.”288 Even when the one-
to-many speech is not on matters of public concern, it has value to listeners 
and to the speaker. And however much we might dislike people saying bad 
things about us, it doesn’t follow that we should have a legal right to stop 
such gossip or criticism, especially by imposing criminal liability.289 
Consider, for instance, a woman whose boyfriend or husband cheated 
on her, frequently and cruelly berated her, or even beat her.290 (Recall that 
some courts treat even allegations of crime as matters of purely “private 
concern” for libel law purposes.)291 She leaves him and announces this in 
several posts to her friends on Facebook—or even on a publicly accessible 
blog that she runs for her acquaintances and other readers. 
She wants her friends to understand what’s happening in her life. She 
wants to warn them against trusting her ex. She wants to feel that she’s 
 
286 See supra note 101. 
287 See supra Part II.C. 
288 People v. Bethea, No. 2003BX036814, 2004 WL 190054, at *1 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Jan. 13, 2004); 
see also State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415, 418, 420–21 (Minn. 1998) (striking down a ban on any 
conduct that “would cause a reasonable person . . . to feel oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated” and 
does cause such a reaction as well as “interfer[ing] with another person or intrud[ing] on the person’s 
privacy or liberty,” partly because the law “criminalizes any number of day-to-day interactions between 
people,” including ones that have no connection to political or social debate); State v. Dronso, 279 
N.W.2d 710, 712 n.1, 714 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (striking down a ban on “mak[ing] a telephone call” 
“[w]ith intent to annoy another” because it would punish, among other things, “a consumer calling the 
seller or producer of a product to express dissatisfaction” and “a businessman calling another to protest 
failure to perform a contractual obligation”). 
289 See, e.g., Evans, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 869–70 (reversing an injunction against an ex-wife’s 
publishing on the Internet “confidential personal information” about her ex-husband, on the grounds 
that the term was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and suggesting that such speech could be 
restricted). 
290 See, e.g., Bethea, 2004 WL 190054, at *4–5 (holding that defendant had the right to post 
offensive and vulgar flyers condemning her ex-boyfriend for refusing to pay child support). 
291 See, e.g., W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1157–58 (N.J. 2012). 
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being open and honest with her friends. And she also wants her ex to feel 
ashamed of himself and to feel that he has lost many of his friends as a 
result of his bad conduct. 
Under many of the laws I discuss in this Article, the woman’s speech 
would be a crime. That is so, for instance, under the New Jersey law 
involved in the Speulda case, with which the Introduction began. The 
law—which the prosecutor interpreted as covering one-to-many speech and 
not just one-to-one speech—makes it a crime to make “a 
communication . . . in offensively coarse language, or any other manner 
likely to cause annoyance or alarm” “with purpose to harass another.”292 
And the Facebook posts or blog posts would indeed likely cause annoyance 
or alarm, and might well have been posted with the purpose “to harass” in 
the sense of having, as one of its purposes, the purpose to make the ex feel 
upset. (A parallel provision of the law also covers “any other course of 
alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or 
seriously annoy such other person,” which suggests that “purpose to . . . 
seriously annoy” is seen as interchangeable with “purpose to harass” under 
the statute.)293 
Likewise, the Washington law involved in the Renton cartoon case 
makes it a crime to, “with intent to harass, intimidate, torment, or 
embarrass any other person . . . make an electronic communication to such 
other person or a third party . . . [u]sing any lewd, lascivious, indecent, or 
obscene words, images, or language.”294 If the woman’s post used 
“indecent” or “lewd” words to describe the ex’s cheating, and part of her 
intent was to “embarrass” her ex, her speech would likewise be criminal.295 
Yet such speech, it seems to me, should remain constitutionally 
protected (again, if it’s not a falsehood, a threat, or some other sort of 
speech that falls within an existing First Amendment exception). As I’ve 
argued elsewhere,296 such speech on “daily life matters” is at least as 
constitutionally worthy as the movies, art, jokes, and reviews of stereo 
systems that the First Amendment has been repeatedly held to protect.297 
 
292 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-4(a) (West 2005). 
293 Id. § 2C:33-4(c). 
294 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260(1)(a) (West 2010). 
295 To be sure, one might hope that a prosecutor won’t go after a speaker who is justifiably upset 
about actual mistreatment and will focus the law on speakers who, say, are lying (though harassment 
laws aren’t facially limited to falsehoods) or whose speech is otherwise seen by many as unjustified. 
But, as the Court held in United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010), a speech restriction may not 
be justified by the expectation of well-exercised prosecutorial discretion. “[T]he First Amendment 
protects against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige. We would not 
uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly.” Id. 
at 1591. 
296 Volokh, supra note 142, at 1092–94. 
297 See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 487, 503–04 (1984) 
(treating product review of stereo equipment as fully protected); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 
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At least as much as those kinds of protected speech, daily life matters 
speech—communication related to “the real, everyday experience of 
ordinary people”298—indirectly but deeply affects the way we view the 
world, deal with others, evaluate their moral claims on us, and even vote; 
and its effect is probably greater than that of most of the paintings we see 
or most of the editorials we read. That “the personal is political” may 
sometimes be an overstatement, but sometimes it’s quite right: consider 
how our understanding of domestic violence, the justice or injustice of 
divorce law, and more can be influenced by learning what has happened 
with our own friends, rather than just what we see written in newspapers 
about strangers. 
There is no doubt that such speech can deeply distress its subjects, 
even if it lacks sufficient provable falsehoods to be libel. That’s especially 
so when the subjects are teenagers, who may lack the life experience to 
handle it effectively. But it’s also true for adults. Humans are social 
creatures. We care deeply about our standing among our friends and 
neighbors, and we care deeply about what people say about us because 
such speech can affect that standing. Terms such as “cyberbullying” are, I 
think, poor labels for derogatory speech about people; I would reserve 
“bullying” for violence and threats of violence. Yet the concern about 
speech that makes people feel socially ostracized, or urges others to 
socially ostracize them, is understandable. 
It doesn’t follow, though, that we should have the right to use the 
coercive power of the legal system to protect our social standing, at least 
where provable falsehoods are not involved. Whether people respect us or 
not is for them to decide. And since those decisions are made based on 
what people hear and read about us, they are entitled to access opinions and 
facts about us without governmental interference. 
Our high standing among our friends and neighbors also gives us some 
power over them: It can cause them to trust us with their money, their 
safety, or their affections. People who think this trust is misplaced, for 
instance because they believe that we have wronged them, should be free to 
express their opinions—and convey the facts that support those opinions. 
For instance, if a lawyer has been suspended from the bar for misuse 
of client funds, the lawyer ought not be able to use the legal system to hide 
this information from the lawyer’s friends and neighbors, who are all 
prospective clients. And third parties should therefore be free to convey 
that factual information, even if a court concludes that the third party’s 
 
U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (“[O]ur cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, 
artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters—to take a nonexhaustive list of labels—is not entitled to 
full First Amendment protection.”); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509–10 (1948) (treating 
entertainment as fully protected). 
298 Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First 
Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 37 (1990). 
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motivation is petty or unworthy.299 Likewise, if a client of a professional or 
a business believes that she has been ill-treated, other prospective clients 
and patrons are entitled to learn about the client’s opinions and the facts 
that the client accurately relates, and to take those complaints for whatever 
the listeners think the complaints are worth.300 The law ought not step in to 
block this information by threatening to imprison people who want to 
spread it. 
So if the speech is libel, it can lead to liability as libel. If it is a threat 
or fighting words, it can be punished as such, and likewise for the other 
First Amendment exceptions. But outside those exceptions, one-to-many 
speech, whether about topics of great public moment or just about the 
speaker’s own personal relationships and tragedies, should remain 
protected—even if it annoys or offends the subject of the speech, and is in 
part intended to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize: 
1. The government has considerable power to protect unwilling 
listeners against unwanted speech to them, at least when that speech is one-
to-one—when it is said directly to them rather than to the public at large, so 
that restricting such one-to-one speech will leave speakers free to 
communicate to willing listeners. This power is not unlimited, especially 
when the speech is to government officeholders or candidates for office. 
But it is generally quite broad, and it explains the constitutionality of 
properly crafted telephone harassment laws, anti-stalking laws, restraining 
order laws, and “stop mailing me” laws when those laws are limited to one-
to-one speech.301 
2. The government has some power to restrict speech about people, 
chiefly threats, knowing falsehoods, and solicitation of crime. 
3. The government probably does not have broad power to criminalize 
speech that reveals private information that is supposedly not “of legitimate 
public concern.” But it may have some power to restrict narrow and clearly 
defined subcategories of speech that reveal private information about 
people when those subcategories consist of speech that is almost never 
 
299 But see Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 752 N.W.2d 359, 370 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that 
such speech constituted punishable harassment). 
300 Compare R.D. v. P.M., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 791, 800 n.11, 801 (Ct. App. 2011) (upholding an 
injunction that barred defendant from, among other things, distributing leaflets critical of plaintiff near 
plaintiff’s workplace; though defendant argued that she had distributed these leaflets “to inform 
consumers about her negative experience with [defendant] as a clinical social worker,” “[t]he trial court 
concluded . . . that [plaintiff’s] intention was less to address an issue of public importance than to harass 
[defendant]”), with Paradise Hills Assocs. v. Procel, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514, 521, 523 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(concluding that disgruntled customers had a First Amendment right to picket home building company). 
301 See supra Part I. 
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relevant to any discussion on either public or private topics. Nude pictures, 
sex videos, and social security numbers are likely the clearest examples of 
this. 
4. Outside these categories, bans on speech about unwilling subjects 
(as opposed to speech to unwanted listeners) are generally unconstitutional. 
First, such bans are content-based speech restrictions. Second, even speech 
that is said with a purpose to annoy or offend is constitutionally protected. 
Third, speech ought not be criminally punishable on the grounds that it is 
of purely “private concern.” And, fourth, while the speech can indeed be 
highly offensive and distressing to its subjects, that doesn’t justify 
outlawing it. 
